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Abstract 
The thesis discusses concepts of ‘concealment’ and ‘unconcealment’ to explore how 
business-as-usual politics offers an inadequate stage for environmental group Extinction 
Rebellion’s urgent demands. Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere is taken as an 
instance of such inadequacy. Jacques Rancière’s critique of Habermas illustrates potential 
concealments within the politics of consensus.  I seek to establish connections, not 
ordinarily made, between Martin Heidegger, Jacques Rancière, and Bertolt Brecht. I 
argue that each theorist offers a potential ‘unconcealment’ for Extinction Rebellion. The 
objective of this thesis is to evaluate these unconcealments as a means for understanding 
and assessing the action of Extinction Rebellion in responding to the climate emergency. 
The motif of the stage acts as a common thread throughout. 
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“This is an emergency and for emergency situations we need emergency action”. 
(Ban Ki-Moon, Former UN Secretary General)1 
Extinction Rebellion (XR) is an environmental movement established in 2018 in the 
United Kingdom, using non-violent direct action to persuade governments to act in 
response to ecological emergency. In their vision they state: ‘our world is in crisis. Life 
itself is under threat. Yet every crisis contains the possibility of transformation’.2 They 
seek to rally worldwide support around a sense of urgency. ‘Calling the conscience of 
humanity to act with the fierce urgency of now’, to tackle ‘climate breakdown’, respond to 
‘an unprecedented global emergency’, and the threat of ‘mass extinction…of our own 
making’.3 The calls of ‘crisis’ and demand for urgent action are in response to scientific 
evidence. Global warming is on track to go over 1.5°C heating by around 2030 and to hit 
2°C heating by around 2050.4 Human action has caused wildlife populations to decline by 
an estimated 60% since the 1970s.5 We risk food shortage as 30% of the world’s arable 
land has become unproductive since the mid-twentieth century.6 Trends such as these 
resulted in scientists, collectively known as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, warning that if global warming reaches 1.5°C or higher, we increase the risk of 
long-lasting or irreversible changes to our planet – such as the total loss of some 
ecosystems.7 Activist Zion Lights, asserts ‘the science is clear’ that unless urgent action 
and radical change is taken to cut carbon emissions by 40% in the next twelve years there 
will be ‘terrifying effects’, with the scale of action requiring us ‘to mobilize all-out, like in 
war time, to halt the crisis’.8 According to Extinction Rebellion, twenty years of climate 
activism following traditional means of protest, petition, lobbying, concerts, and public 







6 Farhana, Yamin, 2019, ‘Die, Survive or Thrive?’, This is Not a Drill: an Extinction Rebellion Handbook, 
Penguin, London, p.26. 
7 https://extinctionrebellion.uk/the-truth/the-emergency/. 
8 Zion Lights, 2019, ‘Hot Earth Rebels’, New Left Review, [Online], Vol. 120, Nov/Dec 2019, pp.107-116. 
Available from: https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/hot-earth-rebels. 
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change. Consequently, ‘we need a new approach to save ourselves and the planet. We need 
to spark a Rebellion’.9 Roger Hallam, co-founder of Extinction Rebellion, explains that a 
human failing to disbelieve what it does not like means that societies will not change with 
the necessary speed. Therefore, rebellion is needed to bring about new social, economic, 
and political systems. He speaks of a ‘common sense’, of the requirement for change 
derived from all the scientific evidence, which is contrary to the presented ‘common sense’ 
that maintains the status quo. 
Extinction Rebellion demand to be heard, and for solutions to be reached to ‘change our 
present cataclysmic course’; to act on behalf of life rather than the continued destruction of 
the planet.10 To do this they aim to break down the old ways of thinking about our 
relationship with the world that have led to the current course towards extinction, and to 
‘rewild’ our perceptions and imagination:  
‘We must learn to dream again, and we have to learn that together’ to move beyond 
our thinking of what is possible and not possible.11  
Their approach has been to foster radical collective action by orchestrating a series of 
events of mass civil disobedience to ‘open up spaces for the impossible’. 12 To show ‘how 
inaction is failing so many’ they create ‘beautiful, emotionally disruptive moments that 
shift the conversation…and invite the public to imagine a better, more collaborative vision 
of tomorrow’.13 The main questions that this dissertation seeks to answer are: whether the 
urgency of their claims is intentionally or unintentionally missed, elided, or dissipated by 
the decision-makers and its formal addressees more generally; when heard, why are 
responses and understanding according to political ‘common sense’ inadequate, anaemic, 
or misplaced?  
 
9 Hallam, Roger, Common Sense for the 21st Century: Only Nonviolent Rebellion Can Stop Climate 
Breakdown and Social Collapse, Version 3.0, https://www.rogerhallam.com/common-sense-for-the-
21st-century/, p.4. 
10 Extinction Rebellion, This is Not a Drill, p.9. 
11 Knights, S. ‘Introduction: The story so far’, This is Not a Drill, p.18. 
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To answer these questions, the term ‘concealment’ will be used to describe what is lost, 
obscured, or mis-categorised in Extinction Rebellion’s radical voice via politics-as-usual. 
The term ‘unconcealment’ will be used to capture the recovery of alternative modalities of 
understanding and engagement, that shift the conversation away from communal 
acceptances. My approach aims to establish unique cross-disciplinary connections between 
phenomenology, political theory, and theatre theory to determine how concealment occurs 
on the political stage offered by liberal democracies. Martin Heidegger, Jacques Rancière, 
and Bertolt Brecht present counter-narratives that help us imagine how Extinction 
Rebellion might create moments of unconcealment, reclaim the stage, and engage with 
audiences otherwise than the ways that formal democracy accustoms us to think of as 
being the political. Heidegger helps us understand that Extinction Rebellion’s potential 
audience most typically seek the comfort of familiar possibilities rather than the difficult 
changes that Extinction Rebellion demand, Brecht demonstrates the necessity to jolt the 
audience into action, and Rancière reveals how aesthetic political acts can engage 
audiences in reinterpreting their world. Establishing these relationships is what this 
dissertation is about.  
In chapter one, I will review, in turn, each of Extinction Rebellion’s ‘Three Demands’ that 
call on governments to (i) ‘Tell the Truth’, (ii) ‘Act now’, and (iii) ‘Go beyond politics’. 
The main question of this chapter is whether the stage offered to Extinction Rebellion fully 
accommodates their contribution to political dialogue. I begin by using Jürgen Habermas’ 
theory of rational discourse, as an example of liberal democratic theory, and via a brief 
exposition consider to what extent the three demands can be met. I then aim to set out, 
utilising three critiques of consensus politics posited by Rancière, that Habermas’ theory 
unintentionally misses something in each demand that conceals a possible objection. The 
second chapter evaluates the notion of ‘unconcealment’ and its opportunities. Rancière, 
Brecht, and Heidegger each posit, within their respective disciplines, a commonly accepted 
way of interpretation (concealment): for Rancière the common way of understanding 
politics is ‘consensus’, for Brecht the common theatre audience interprets the stage 
dramatically, and for Heidegger human beings typically interpret the world as everyone 
does. However, there is also an alternative that unconceals what is concealed by the 
everyday common-sense: Rancière’s account of ‘dissensus’ reconfigures the appearance of 
politics beyond the consensual, Bertolt Brecht’s alienation effect brings new awakening to 
theatre audiences, Heidegger’s moment of ‘clearing’ occurs as an ‘emergence from a state 
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of hiddenness’.14 In the third chapter, I seek to connect the concepts evaluated in chapter 
two to the challenge faced by Extinction Rebellion. The third chapter, therefore, 
contemplates the concealing context in which the stage is set for Extinction Rebellion and 
how each potential unconcealment can be adopted by them to advance the type of change 
and action that they demand of government and their audience. I conclude with a brief 
consideration of whether such moments of unconcealment can establish a relationship of 
‘reverence’ for our world, what Heidegger terms ‘care’.15  
 
14 ‘At the heart of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of being was his notion of the “clearing”. The clearing 
is much more than just a space where something has been cleared away. It is an opening through 
which entities other than ourselves can emerge out of hiddenness, or are made visible by a bringing 
into the light. In one sense the clearing is the place or site where such unconcealment occurs, in the 
presence of the human form of being that Heidegger calls Dasein. In another sense Dasein is the 
clearing’. Edgeworth, Matt, 2006, ‘The Clearing: Heidegger and Excavation’, Studio Michael Shanks – 




15 Young, Julian, 2002, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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1 Consensus as concealment    
1.1 Demand one: ‘Tell the truth’ 
1.1.1 Habermas: truth and consensus 
Extinction Rebellion declare the ‘truth is simple: there’s an emergency, that’s just a fact’16. 
They set out their first demand that: ‘the government must tell the truth by declaring a 
climate and ecological emergency, working with other institutions to communicate the 
urgency for change’.17 Hallam argues the urgency of the threat, and the extent of radical 
change needed, is being played down by governments, creating climate scepticism and 
leaving ‘inaction in its wake’.18 Consequently, Extinction Rebellion claim their role is to 
‘speak the truth and demand real political change’. 19  ‘Today’s struggle for truth is that 
extinction and extermination are not inevitable’,20 but it requires actions like planting 
trillions of trees, or the equivalent an area the size of America, to stay below 1.5C 
warming.21 The movement was set up, therefore, to ‘tell the truth and act as if the truth was 
real’.22 ‘Tell the truth’, is both a request of governments and a declaration of the truth of 
the climate emergency. All three of Extinction Rebellion’s demands play a dual role as a 
speech act of making a request and saying something about their own version of politics. 
As the goal of Extinction Rebellion’s speech acts is to mobilise political action, it is 
instructive therefore, to interpret the demands through Jürgen Habermas’ communicative 
rationality and consensus theory. Habermas adopts speech act theory to assess how claims 
to truth are integral to communication, and once set within the public sphere operate as the 
mechanisms through which political discourse can constitute democracy. Thus ‘truth’, 
Habermas argues, is an integral part of political action. 
Habermas suggests ‘communicative rationality’ is how human action, including political, 
is orchestrated. In Theory of Communicative Action23 he argues that ‘social cooperation’ 
 
16 Zion Lights, ‘Hot Earth Rebels’, pp.107-116. 
17 Knights, ‘Introduction’, p.17. 
18 Hallam, Roger, Common Sense, p.4. 
19 Shiva, Vandana, ‘Foreword’, This is not a Drill, p.14. 
20 Ibid. 
21 https://extinctionrebellion.uk/the-truth/the-emergency/. 
22 Hallam, Common Sense, p.19. 
23 Habermas, J. 1984, The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of society, 
Heinemann, London. 
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depends on the way we interact through communication.24 Cooperation is founded on a 
claim to truth in an utterance that has the potential to be rationally accepted, a shared 
understanding reached between the speaker and the listener, with the outcome being the 
potential for action to be co-ordinated from this understanding. In an adaptation of speech 
act theory, Habermas rejects a positivist theory of language that it is used simply to say 
something about the world. Instead, a propositional truth claim, that can be accepted as 
‘true’ or ‘false’, is the cornerstone of how we share beliefs about the world, establish 
relationships with one another, share information, and co-ordinate future possibilities.25 
Integral to speech acts is the idea of truth. ‘Tell the truth’, understood as a speech act 
makes three assertions that can be accepted or rejected on their: sincerity, rightness, and 
truth. To achieve all three equates to Habermas’ highest standard of communicative action 
and formulates his idealised discourse principle: ‘consensus’.26 ‘Consensus’ is idealised 
because it ‘depends on a hearer responding with ‘yes’’ to each of the three claims within 
the ‘validity claim’, ‘criticisable utterances that are accessible in principle to argumentative 
clarification’,27 where a more likely reaction is ‘no’, ‘maybe’, or ‘tell me more’.28 
Habermas’ claim within the idealised principle, however, is that interlocutors enter 
discourse with the objective of reaching a shared understanding, rationally agreed. It is 
such agreement that makes way for conflict-free interaction, by considering the validity of 
the argument.29  On entering the stage of discourse, within the ideal speech scene, each 
interlocutor presumes the other to be rational and willing to reach agreement and is 
prepared to give reasons to back up their validity claims. A claim to validity through 
reason, therefore, is intertwined in Habermas’ theory of consensus; it defines ‘the end of a 
spectrum of communicative possibilities’.30 
 
24 Bohman, James and William Rehg, 2017, ‘Jürgen Habermas’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, Fall 2017 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/habermas/>. 
25 Cherem, Max, ‘Jürgen Habermas’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
https://iep.utm.edu/habermas/. 
26 Bohman and Rehg, ‘Habermas’. 
27 Habermas, J., Rehg, W. 1997, Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and 
democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, pp.4-5. 
28 Cooke, Maeve, 1993, ‘Habermas and Consensus’, European journal of philosophy, vol. 1, no. 3, pp.247-
267, p.248. 
29 Cherem, ‘Habermas’. 
30 Bohman and Rehg, ‘Jürgen Habermas’. 
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Habermas takes the goal of reaching rational agreement within communicative exchanges 
and solidifies consensus as the ‘end of the spectrum’ by institutionalising consensus in law, 
where the: 
‘only regulations and ways of acting that can claim legitimacy are those to which 
all who are possibly affected could assent to participants in rational discourse…As 
legal subjects, they must anchor this practice of self-legalisation in the medium of 
law itself; they must legally institutionalize those communicative presuppositions 
and procedures of a political opinion-and will-formation in which the discourse 
principle is applied’31.  
The ‘discourse principle’ states that law is necessary for validity claims to be formalised 
and consensus institutionalised. The idealising principles in Habermas’ discourse theory 
make possible the coordination of action, development of norms through agreement, and 
the institutionalisation of those norms through legitimised mechanisms of politics and law. 
Emphasising their discursive nature, laws are formed as they emerge in norms after the 
discourse process has been complete. Norms then contribute to stabilising society from 
risks of constant disagreement.  
Democracy is realised when ‘all the later generations’ adopt laws in the actualisation of 
their rights. 32 Consensus, for Habermas, succeeds with active and communicative 
participation from citizens as they adopt rights. It is in this way that citizens realise the 
benefits and protections of constitutional democracy. As they adopt rights they are 
interpreting and re-interpreting the constitution in their own image.  Thus, the initial 
formation of the constitution must always be understood as a ‘self-correcting learning 
process’.33 Interpretive battles can subsequently form where ‘underprivileged classes’ enter 
the debate and reinterpret the assumptions of the constitution. Such groups actualise rights 
and gain their own voice by ‘appropriating the constitution and its history of 
interpretation’.34 This is the shared process of ‘a self-determining community of free and 
 
31 Ibid., p.458. 
32 Habermas, J. & Rehg, W. 2001, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?’, Political theory, vol. 29, no. 6, pp.766-781. p.774. 
33 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p.774. 
34 Ibid., p.775. 
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equal citizens’, where all citizens can at any time review and critique the constitution with 
their own backgrounds, cultures, needs, and desires: 
‘A constitution-making practice requires more than just a discourse principle by 
which citizens can judge whether the law they enact is legitimate. Rather, the very 
forms of communication that are supposed to make it possible to form a rational 
political will through discourse need to be legally institutionalised themselves. In 
assuming a legal shape, the discourse principle is transformed into a principle of 
democracy’.35 
Even once consensus founds democracy, Habermas encourages ongoing participation from 
citizens to constantly assess existing laws and re-interpret the constitution. The shift from 
the discourse principle to a ‘principle of democracy’ underscores Habermas’ argument that 
the principle is egalitarian. Citizens can, in Habermas’ view, engage in the democratic 
process whilst entering the idealised stage of discourse as equals. Habermas asserts that 
democratic procedure of ‘lawmaking relies on citizens making use of their communicative 
and participatory rights’, and to do so ‘with an orientation toward the common good, and 
attitude that can indeed be politically called for but not legally compelled’.36 Law plays its 
role in protecting the discourse principle as the legal code is ‘completed through 
communicative and participatory rights that guarantee equal opportunities for the public 
use of communicative liberties’.37 The discourse principle acquires the ‘legal shape’ of the 
democratic principle, as well as confirmation of equal rights to enter political discourse, as 
citizens ‘have an equal right to participate in the collective decision-making process’.38  
Extinction Rebellion’s first demand can be translated via Habermas’ discourse and 
consensus theory, allowing them to make the initial truth claim via rational discourse that a 
climate emergency exists. If the validity claim meets the idealising requirements of 
sincerity, rightness, and truth then the second part of Extinction Rebellion’s first demand 
that governments should communicate the urgency of need for change can be formulated 
into societal norms and laws. Through their citizenship they can take part in the collective 
decision-making process by initiating a participatory review to reinterpret prevailing 
 
35 Ibid., p.455. 
36 Ibid., p.461. 
37 Ibid., p.458. 
38 Ibid., pp.458-460. 
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consensus, where norms are deemed to result in insufficient legal protection against the 
climate emergency. Why then, when the rational arguments are compelling enough for 
governments to begin to declare a climate emergency, have responses inadequately met the 
demand to tell the truth about the urgent the need for radical change?  
1.1.2 Rancière: consensus conceals voice 
‘In times of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act’. 
(George Orwell)39 
In Rancière’s seminal work Disagreement he mounts a direct challenge to Habermas’ 
rational discourse. Rancière’s challenge is, before commencing the process of assessing 
validity claims against the measures of truth, sincerity, and rightness that form rational and 
political discourse, other questions must be asked first:  
‘Before any confrontation of interests and values, before any assertions are 
submitted to demands for validation between established partners, there is the 
dispute over the object of the dispute, the dispute over the existence of the dispute 
and the parties confronting each other in it. For the idea that speaking beings are 
equal because of their common capacity for speech is a reasonable unreasonable 
idea’.40 
Rancière asks two questions that seek to disrupt the assumptions on which Habermas’ 
idealised speech scene are based: what is the ‘wrong’ on which the dispute is based? What 
is ‘the capacity of those who are making an object’ of the wrong; can the voices emerging 
from the wrong be equally heard?41 Rancière questions the reality of interlocutors entering 
the scene with ‘equal communication rights’, through his concept of ‘wrong’. Wrong is the 
‘original structure of all politics’ and ‘simply the mode of subjectification in which the 
assertion of equality takes its political shape’:42  
 
39 Orwell, George cited in Extinction Rebellion, This is Not a Drill, p.23. 
40 Rancière, Jacques, 1999, Disagreement: politics and philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, Minn; London, p.55. 
41 Ibid., p.xii. 
42 Ibid., p.39. 
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‘wrong institutes a singular universal, a polemical universal, by tying the 
presentation of equality, as the part of those who have no part, to the conflict 
between parts of society’.43  
Rather than derive politics and democracy from a false assumption of equality on entering 
the stage of discourse, Rancière uses ‘wrong’ to discuss the concealing nature of the 
assumption of universal rights. The assumption is falsely applied to all; what should be 
discussed instead is why and how there are those who have ‘no part’. Key to politics is 
discussing this reality, not concealing behind a false universal equality. The ‘heart of 
politics lies in a double wrong, a fundamental conflict, never conducted as such, over the 
relationship between the capacity of the speaking being who is without qualification and 
political capacity’.44 The demand to ‘tell the truth’, begins by unconcealing that there are 
those who do not have an equal voice, and therefore unequally enter the discursive political 
stage. 
Habermas argues that disenfranchised voices can bring their validity claims through 
rational discourse to be debated. They can re-interpret consensual norms from their 
worldview.45 However, Rancière contends that before the disenfranchised enter the stage 
of political discourse:  
‘there is the symbolic distribution of bodies that divides them into two categories: 
those that one sees and those that one does not see, those who have a logos…and 
those who have no logos’.46  
Rather than ask whether Extinction Rebellion’s validity claims can be accepted into, or 
reinterpret consensus, we must first ask in what way have they been distributed by 
consensus. This grounds the discussion of political ‘wrong’ in establishing whether the 
political content of the need for radical and urgent change to the status quo is 
acknowledged, understood, or heard in their demand to ‘tell the truth’. 
 
43 Ibid., p.39. 
44 Rancière, Disagreement, p.22. 
45 Habermas, J. 1994, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, Taylor, C., 
Gutmann, A. & ProQuest (Firm), 1994, Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J. pp.107-148. 
46 Rancière, Disagreement, p.22. 
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Rancière argues the reason Habermas starts his analysis of discourse from an incorrect 
starting point is because he builds in presumed equality: the ‘empty “freedom”’47 of ‘equal 
communication rights for participants’48 of free speech. Instead, the equality on which it is 
assumed interlocutors enter the stage demands ‘infinite’ ‘verification’ to establish whether 
a claim to truth can even be heard, and if heard whether it is elided or dissipated.49 
Rancière illustrates his challenge with Pierre-Simon Ballanche’s 1829 reinterpretation of 
Livy’s tale of the secession of the Roman plebians on the Aventine Hill. Ballanche 
criticises Livy’s account for only being able to see the event as a revolt or uprising, failing 
to acknowledge that the dispute was about speech itself. Rancière argues that Ballanche 
‘performs a restaging’, retelling the fable to ask the question of whether there ‘exists a 
common stage where plebeians and patricians can debate anything’.50 The patricians and 
Consul Menenius did not enter discussion with the plebs because they assumed that they 
were nameless and had no voice. The plebs respond not physically ‘as warriors equal to 
other warriors’, as Livy’s description of a revolt would assume, but as speaking beings 
exercising a number of speech acts.51 By asking Menenius for a treaty, they make a 
declarative speech act only available to those with the capacity for speech. Rancière 
admires Ballanche’s reinterpretation because it acknowledges the fundamental ‘wrong’ 
that the patricians did not consider the plebs to be speaking beings capable of debate. The 
patricians heard only ‘noise’, thus denying the plebs the capacity to be heard as they 
intended.52 It is only once the plebs act as if they can be heard, by uttering speech acts, that 
the patricians’ preconceptions are disrupted: they need to reorder what makes sense to 
them. When the plebs continue to speak like patricians, the patricians realise there is 
nothing left to do but to speak to the plebs.  
Habermas’ idealising principle aims to avoid the situation described on the Aventine Hill. 
Following rational discourse, the patricians should have accepted the plebs as equal 
speakers. Habermas would likely criticise UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s dismissal of 
 
47 Ibid., p.35. 
48 Habermas, J, 1999, ‘Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections’, Denver University Legal 
Review, vol. 76, in Freeman, M.D.A. & Lloyd of Hampstead, Dennis Lloyd, Baron, 2001, Lloyd's 
introduction to jurisprudence, 7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, pp. 794-798, p. 797. 
49 Rancière, Disagreement, p.39. 
50 Ibid., p.23. 
51 Ibid., p.24. 
52 Ibid. 
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Extinction Rebellion’s political voice by branding them “uncooperative crusties”,53 
because, like the patricians, this denies them entry to the stage. Habermas would categorise 
Johnson’s rejection of XR’s voice as an example of a speech scene that fails to meet the 
idealising criteria of consensus, as ‘strategic discourse’54. Despite acknowledging that 
those in power can fail to adhere to the idealised principle by carrying out discourse that 
seeks self-interest rather than agreement reached rationally, the issue with Habermas’ 
theory is that he relies on the idealised formula of rational discourse to legitimise political 
decision making and will-formation via consensus. That means that political change is 
limited to situations where both parties in the exchange are committed to the idealised 
formula of consensus, thus discounting when those in power dismiss, ignore, or trivialise 
the voice their political interlocutor, or where the dissenting voice enters the stage with no 
voice at all. Hallam argues against what he calls ‘reformism’, a shorthand for advocates of 
achieving political reform by interpreting and re-interpreting prevailing consensus through 
political discourse, characterising its limitations in:    
‘The statement ‘tell the truth and act as if that truth is real’ is an extreme violation 
of the reformist paradigm. For [in] reformism you only tell the truth to the extent 
that you think people can cope with it and you only act on it to the extent that you 
think you can win (in a gradualist way). This is how reformism ends up in a 
morally and spiritually bad place – lying and holding back actions which are now 
justified. So, what is the revolutionary alternative?’55 
This passage points to the value of Rancière’s corrective; it allows the political interlocutor 
to ‘act as if’ their voice is fully heard. The risk, as Hallam explains, is that the idealising 
requirement of consensus to legitimise political argument may stymie the ambitions of the 
interlocutor’s demands. The truth they are telling may be too radical for the status quo and 
existing distribution of role and place. Accepting a validity claim to ‘truth’ could pose too 
much disruption to be rationally accepted by those in power. 
 
53 Rawlinson, Kevin, Tuesday 8th October 2019, ‘Extinction Rebellion: Johnson calls climate crisis 
activists 'uncooperative crusties'’, Guardian Online, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/07/uncooperative-crusties-boris-johnson-attacks-
extinction-rebellion-activists. 
54 ‘Strategic action’, contrary to consensus, is a mode of discourse where one party seeks its own self-
interest rather than rational agreement – bargaining with threats and promises to induce the other to 
cooperate. Regh, William, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p.xvii. 
55 Hallam, Common Sense, pp.19-20. 
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1.2 Demand two: ‘Act now’ 
1.2.1 Habermas: action and law 
Extinction Rebellion’s second demand is that ‘the government must act now to halt 
biodiversity loss and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions to net zero by 2025’.56 Their 
‘Climate and Ecology Bill’ details an expectation that the Secretary of State will be 
responsible for ensuring that the demands are met and within six months of the passing of 
this Act publish a strategy specifying the measures to achieve the objective of net zero by 
2025.57 The demand to ‘act now’ will be satisfied if governments set legally binding 
targets in legislation, and that same legislation places an obligation on government to take 
the appropriate action to meet the targets. It is useful, therefore, to briefly set out how laws 
are formed in Habermas’ constitutional democratic theory through discourse and 
participation from citizens, and how, once created, these laws protect citizens. In Between 
Facts and Norms Habermas’ discourse theory is realised as democratic participation in 
politics by legal discourse that develops modern law and justice.58 Consensus goes beyond 
how we all get along through co-ordinated actions that constitute norms. It is developed as 
the concept for how we as citizens access our freedoms through legal institutions that 
legitimise constitutional democracy and realise equality: 
‘Without basic rights that secure the private autonomy of citizens, there also would 
not be any medium for legal institutionalization of the conditions under which these 
citizens could make use of their public autonomy’.59  
Constitutionalism is, for Habermas, the institutional expression of the public sphere, 
formalising rational discussion, and creating the grounds for political participation. Once 
formed, the constitution becomes the guarantor of political communication through the 
 
56 Knights, ‘Introduction’, p.17. 
57 Extinction Rebellion submitted their ‘Three Demands Bill’ formally to UK Parliament on 02 
September 2020. The motion has been signed by 92 members of parliament. Climate and Ecology Bill, 
Bill 172, 58/1, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-01/0172/200172.pdf. 
58 Huttunen, R. & Heikkinen, H.L.T. 1998, ‘Between facts and norms: action research in the light of 
Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action and discourse theory of justice’, Curriculum studies, 
vol.6, no.3, pp.307-322. 
59 Habermas, ‘An Author’s Reflections’, p.796. 
Page 1-17 of 90 
 
 
right of political freedom of speech.60  Consequently, the state and law are endorsed as 
guarantor of the political discursive process; they protect the demand to act now and set the 
stage of law as the place for the necessary action. 
The links between discourse, politics, law, citizenship, and constitutional democracy are 
woven through the stages of Habermas’ discourse theory: pragmatic; ethical-political; 
moral; completing the process with legal discourse to formalise the agreed upon norm. 
Law is a coercible set of rules that involve an appeal to reason to underwrite them; rational 
citizens should find the laws acceptable and through consensus sign up to them. Law is 
legitimate if it guarantees two things at once. First, it guarantees individual autonomy by 
demarcating areas where private individuals can exercise their free choice as they desire. 
Second, it secures public autonomy through legal order because reasonable citizens 
rationally assent to the constraints law places on the enactment of their individual freedoms 
and rights.61 Habermas formulates (i) ‘only those outcomes can count as legitimate upon 
which equally entitled participants in the deliberation can freely agree’, in doing so (ii) ‘the 
participants commit themselves to modern law as the medium for regulating the common 
life’, and they do this because (iii) ‘no one is truly free until all citizens enjoy equal 
liberties under laws that they have given themselves after reasonable deliberation’.62 
Democratic processes are legitimised by legal institutions and the rule of law, and these 
institutions require to be ‘legally constituted in the right way’.63 The ‘right way’ is when 
‘legitimisation depends…on an appropriate legal institutionalization of those forms of 
rational discourse and fair bargaining that ground the presumption of the rational 
acceptability of outcomes…politics is thus wedded to a complex notion of procedural 
legitimacy’.64 Any political outcome has a ‘circular self-constitution’65 if it is achieved 
through discourse and follows this process.  
 
60 Christodoulidis, E.A. 1998, Law and reflexive politics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, London; 
Dordrecht, pp.19-30. 
61 Regh, William, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p.xxv 
62 Habermas and Rehg, ‘Constitutional Democracy’, p.772. 
63 Michelman, Frank, 1998, ‘Constitutional Authorship’, Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, 
ed. L. Alexander, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.91 in Habermas and Rehg, ‘Constitutional 
Democracy’, p.773. 
64 Habermas, ‘An Author’s Reflections’, p.794. 
65 Habermas and Rehg, ‘Constitutional Democracy’, p.774. 
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Law’s ‘validity lies ultimately’ in its ‘capacity to make claims supported by reason in a 
discourse that aims at, and depends on, agreement between citizens’.66 When laws are 
validated by citizens’ agreement, this forms the foundation of Habermas’ ‘discourse 
principle’ that norms are universally accepted. Legal norms, for Habermas, are ‘what is left 
from a crumbled cement of society’,67 facilitating social integration and making law central 
to the organisation of complex western democracies. Social integration occurs as ‘modern 
law is supposed to grant an equal distribution of subjective rights for everybody’ and these 
rights are ‘liberties’ that ‘function as a protective belt for each person’s pursuit of his or her 
own preferences and value orientations’.68 Law offers citizenry and protects free speech. 
‘Modern law’, formed by system of norms, is ‘freedom-guaranteeing’ ensuring that the 
‘norms guarantee the autonomy of all legal persons equally’. 69 Laws are formed 
discursively with the agreement of those affected, whilst playing a role of protecting the 
ability of citizens to engage in the discursive political process of forming them. Habermas’ 
theory allows Extinction Rebellion to rationally argue that climate change exists and sets 
the framework for how rational discourse can be formalised into law. To meet the second 
demand to create law that binds the government to meet greenhouse gas emission targets, 
the proposed law would need to be freely agreed by all citizens. Citizens, the theory goes, 
commit to the law to coordinate their action, submitting to it as the means of protecting 
their rights and freedoms. In This is not a Drill, contributors argue that the bonds of the 
‘social contract’ have been broken as government is not fulfilling its duty to protect its 
citizens; government is failing to set the legal obligations, design the strategy, or make the 
necessary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Extinction Rebellion’s 
‘Declaration of Rebellion’ sets out their rationale that when a government and law:  
‘fail to provide any assurance of adequate protection of and security for its people’s 
well-being and the nation’s future, it becomes the right of citizens to seek redress to 
restore dutiful democracy and to secure the solutions needed to avert catastrophe 
and protect the future. It becomes not only our right but our sacred duty to rebel’.70   
 
66 Cotterrell, R cited in Freeman, Lloyd's introduction, p.693. 
67 Habermas, ‘An Author’s Reflections’, p.794. 
68 Ibid., p.795. 
69 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p.447. 
70 Extinction Rebellion, This is Not a Drill, p.9. 
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If law is ‘freedom-guaranteeing’, protecting the citizens who rationally sign up to it, why 
have such laws failed to protect us from the climate emergency, with associated action 
plans failing to materialise? Why has it been necessary to spark a rebellion? 
1.2.2 Rancière: Law conceals politics 
‘Power conceded nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will’. 
(Frederick Douglas)71 
In Habermas’ theory law plays a central role as citizens participate and enact legally 
protected rights. This discursive participation is, for Habermas, the legitimising link 
between law and democracy. The main considerations for Rancière in Disagreement are 
the difference between ‘the practices and legitimizations of the consensus system’ in 
liberal theory, with law as key to the legitimisation, and what should be considered 
‘democracy’.72 In Steve Corcoran’s opinion Rancière’s achievement is that he has enabled 
us to see more clearly that the great achievement of consensus is the loss of thought and 
practice of emancipation.73 The concealing power of liberal democracy is that as a 
consequence of the presumption of citizen’s participation in the legitimisation of law and 
state institutions, there is no need for politics as an emancipatory project. Both the ‘left’ 
and ‘right’, Rancière argues, ‘have come to agree that capitalism and its political form of 
‘liberal democracy’ are the ‘ultimate horizon’ as they enshrine the protection of citizens’ 
individual and public autonomy.74 Habermas, as an advocate of liberal democracy, 
consistently argues that any norm set can, in the future, be challenged when a 
disenfranchised cultural worldview seeks a different interpretation of those norms. 
‘Struggles for recognition’ ensure the rights and freedoms of disenfranchised groups are 
protected so that they can pursue their individual and public autonomy in their own way.75 
Yet this practice of ‘renewal’ never transcends the horizon, but simply re-instates the 
conditions of liberal democracy. Whilst challenge to norms and laws are theoretically 
welcomed in liberal democracy, criticism is forever harnessed to protecting individual 
 
71 Douglas, Frederick cited in Extinction Rebellion, This is Not a Drill, p.23. 
72 Rancière, Disagreement, p.xiii. 
73 Rancière, J. & Corcoran, S. 2010, ‘Ten Theses of Politics’, Dissensus: on politics and aesthetics, 
Continuum, London; New York, NY, p.12. 
74 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses’, pp.12-13. 
75 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition’, pp.107-148. 
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rights and freedoms.76 Corcoran argues that it is the counter-logic of protection of 
individual and public autonomy that closes the possibility of a challenge when opposing 
interests are at stake.  This leaves untouched any self-interest that exists, meaning that any 
challenge that points to the self-interest can be concealed in the language of the legal 
protection of individual rights.  
Habermas sets out a ‘self-constitutional’ discursive process through which rationality 
builds up from discussion to legitimisation of the institutions of state. Rancière questions 
this double-bond of rationality and legitimisation that makes the institutions of 
constitutional democracy, or the interests on which rights claims are based, difficult to 
challenge. He shows how liberal democracy has historically set itself up against the utopia 
of totalitarianism: ‘the consensus system celebrated its victory over totalitarianism as the 
final victory of law over nonlaw and of realism over utopias’.77 Liberalism legitimises 
itself by this contrast, demonstrating that it is the most effective means of maintaining 
‘political forms of justice and economic forms of production of wealth, as well as setting 
up interests and optimising gains for all’.78 The founding of liberal democracy’s self-
sustaining character is that it is worth giving up rights and equality for the sake of the 
protection of the economic gains of all. The argument is that the state is the most efficient 
means of managing the gains for all and ‘shores up legitimization of the so-called 
democratic regime’.79 Once legitimised, liberal democracy’s victory is in its acceptance as 
the ‘ultimate horizon’. 80 
Consensus’ ultimate concealing achievement, Rancière argues, is by ‘closing the 
boundary’ between ‘appearance and reality’, signifying the distinction between the 
appearance of equal rights constituted by law, conceals the reality of inequality in 
accessing them. 81 Rights can appear to exist as ‘fact’ because they are normatively 
constituted, however in reality none exist if the political horizon is set as ‘each part of the 
social body would obtain the best share that it can obtain’.82 ‘Every situation, every 
 
76 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses’, p.13. 
77 Rancière, Disagreement, p.124. 
78 Ibid., p.95. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses’, pp.12-13 
81 Rancière, J. 2004, ‘Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, The South Atlantic quarterly, vol. 103, no. 
2-3, pp. 297-310, p.309. 
82Ibid., p.306. 
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possible dispute’ is broken down to its components which transforms the parties to the 
dispute to an identity defined by what is protected by law, thus depriving the parties of 
politics.83 Rancière describes politics as being ‘evacuated’ when there is ‘no interval 
between law and fact’, meaning the appearance that law creates of equality, disables the 
ability to dispute a ‘wrong’ of inequality. 84 There is also no gap between what is real and 
what is possible because possibilities are closed, and horizons of possibility set by the 
limitations of the homogenised community. ‘Police’85 order asserts that the only thing that 
is possible, in all circumstances, is what it is already doing and determined by economic 
necessity of world capital. Police logic is the absorption of everything into the only thing 
possible.  
The state and its actions are ‘checked by law’, indicating that the law offers checks and 
balances for citizen against the state through rights, that can be taken up if it is deemed that 
the state has gone beyond its powers.86 The state then establishes its authority, through its 
own weakness, as it has already positioned that there is no choice for the state and that its 
only choices are determined by the ‘world-wide necessity it is dominated by…the 
constraints and caprices of the world market’.87 The weakness and the lack of choice for 
the state is then shared with the citizen. When a citizen calls on its rights to protect itself 
against the state, it can do so only within the confines of the prevailing logic: ‘the “almost 
nothing” of a possible on which everyone’s prosperity as well as the maintenance of the 
community bond depends’.88 The possibilities offered by citizens’ rights are set within the 
horizons of the necessity of economic expediency. The possible ‘is thereby the conceptual 
exchanger of “reality” and “necessity”,’ or at least the judgement by consensus logic of 
what is deemed necessary.89  
 
83 Rancière, Disagreement, p.112 
84 Rancière, Disagreement, pp.107-112. 
85 Rancière defines his concept of the police as: ‘This 'natural' logic, a distribution of the invisible and 
visible, of speech and noise, pins bodies to 'their' places and allocates the private and the public to 
distinct 'parts' - this is the order of the police.’ Rancière, Disagreement, p.102. ‘Politics’, by contrast, is 
the activity that breaks with the order of the police by inventing new subjects. Ranciere, Jacques, 2010, 
‘The Paradoxes of Political Art’, Rancière, J. & Corcoran, S. Dissensus: on politics and aesthetics, 
Continuum, London; New York, NY, p.139. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., p.113. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., p.132. 
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Habermas encourages an increase in discourse for recognition, for challenging norms, as 
this strengthens the consensus on which the system is based. What the state ‘relinquishes 
by having itself incessantly checked…it regains in legitimization’;90 not only legitimation 
of itself, but legitimisation of the self-interest it protects: 
‘it only ever does the only thing possible, only ever what is required by strict 
necessity in the context of the growing intricacy of economies within the global 
market’.91 
The state is ‘dominated’ by the necessity of economic logic, ‘the world-wide necessity’ 
that it must work within.92 The state limits its power by submitting itself to the logic of 
necessity but following this through means that challenges to the state are also limited by 
the same logic. Governments claim their legitimacy as being best placed to manage capital 
for the optimal share of its citizens, locking in its legitimisation maintaining everyone’s 
prosperity. The increasing link between the individual rights and state legitimisation, 
serves in ‘making each person the reflection of the soul of the community’ by assessing 
rights claims based on how well they reflect the identity of the community provided by 
law, creating the:  
‘fanaticism of the tie that binds individuals and groups together in a fabric with no 
holes, no gap between names and things, rights and facts, individuals and subjects, 
with no intervals in which forms of community in dispute, nonsecular form of 
community, may be constructed’.93 
It is assumed that nobody is excluded from the ‘rational’ logic that everyone wants to get 
their share, leaving nothing left to dispute as to do so would be contradictory to this logic. 
A ‘saturation of consensus’ is achieved because everyone is included in the logic and 
community of wanting to get one’s share in advance, countable only in the aggregate of the 
community, so nobody is left to challenge it. 94 Where there is a challenge it is limited by 
the logic of necessity. Therefore, where a dissenting voice attempts to bring appearance to 
a ‘wrong’, this voice is deemed a threat to the community getting their optimal share, as 
 
90 Ibid., p.112. 
91 Ibid., p.113. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p.115. 
94 Ibid., pp.116-117. 
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administered by the state. As there is only one logic that makes sense, there is an 
‘evaporation’ of politics.95 
Consensus’ victory is all subsuming by negating the possibility of any political challenge 
to its logic. What is lost in a dispute being processed by the law is the political content and 
the demand to act now. Activist Zoe Blackler summarises: 
“rather than wasting its time and money seeking to silence and criminalise those 
who are drawing its attention to the Climate and Ecological Emergency, we call on 
the Government to act now on the biggest threat to our planet. Where is its plan?”96 
Habermas’ theory allows XR to raise the legal challenge, but as Rancière describes 
equality before the law can be empty when the gap between legal equality and factual 
inequality is obscured. Rancière argues liberal theory does not allow the gap to be 
discussed, the political content of the dispute reviewed, where disputes assessed only 
within the horizons or prevailing logic and interests. Legal processing of a dispute is an 
existing ‘inscription’ of equality97 where all are equal before the law. What Blackler and 
other activists want to discuss is that when their activism is criminalised, they are not 
represented within the ‘community’ of citizens whose rights law is in place to protect. 
Criminalisation of Extinction Rebellion’s activism is an example of the ‘saturation of 
consensus and exclusion of politics’.98 The activists’ call to ‘act now’ with radical changes 
to society and economy are deemed by consensus as a displacement of citizens’ rights to 
their optimal share. When the narrative is reduced to the undesirability of the activists’ 
actions, when they are processed by law, the appearance of political wrong, of how the 
prevailing economic model is contributing to the climate emergency, is lost, and replaced 
by the otherness of the criminal. What is concealed or obscured, therefore, is possibilities 
in the political demand for action, that go beyond what is defined as the identity of the 
community. Extinction Rebellion are demanding more than a right to appeal legal 
 
95 Ibid., p. 109 
96 Blackler, Zoe, November 06 2019, ‘Extinction Rebellion wins landmark legal challenge to Met Police 
ban on peaceful protest’, Extinction Rebellion, https://rebellion.earth/2019/11/06/extinction-
rebellion-wins-landmark-legal-challenge-to-met-police-ban-on-peaceful-protest-2/. 
97 Rancière, Disagreement, p.100. 
98 Ibid., pp.116-117. 
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decisions, but a ‘plan’ inscribed in law that holds government to account to address the 
“biggest threat to our planet”. 
1.3 Demand three: ‘Beyond politics’ 
1.3.1 Habermas: politics and public sphere 
Extinction Rebellion’s third demand is to ‘go beyond politics’: ‘the government must 
create and be led by the decisions of a Citizens’ Assembly on climate and ecological 
justice’.99 They demand change from politics-as-usual that, in their view, has held back 
progress in resolving the climate emergency, proposing instead a politics of listening and 
dialogue that drives unity and action. They argue a stage must be set for this dialogue to 
occur enabling political power and decision-making to be placed in the hands of citizens.100 
Habermas sets out the public sphere as the stage and institutional expression of this critical 
and rational discourse, with public participation by citizens.101 The public sphere is the 
realm for revitalising politics with rational argumentation, that mediates between state and 
society by representing public opinion. Habermas states ‘public opinion represents political 
potentials that can be used for influencing the voting behavior of citizens or the will-
formation in parliamentary bodies, administrative agencies, and courts’.102 Sitting between 
state and society, the public sphere both protects society and the lifeworld from 
encroachment from state influence with its own ideology, and the mechanism through 
which citizens can influence political-will-formation and law-making. Habermas describes 
the connecting role that the public sphere plays between state and society, for it draws ‘its 
impulses from the private handling of social problems that resonate in life histories’, 
meaning problems in the public sphere come from the private life experiences of the public 
– who take that to the public sphere to debate.103 
The public sphere is ‘a sounding board for problems that must be processed by the political 
system because they cannot be solved elsewhere’.104 It not only identifies problems in the 
‘sounding board’ but will ‘also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish 
 
99 Knights, ‘Introduction’, p.17. 
100 https://extinctionrebellion.uk/go-beyond-politics/. 
101 Christodoulidis, Law and reflexive politics, p.26. 
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them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and 
dealt with by parliamentary complexes’.105 It is not an institution or organisation but a 
‘network’ of communication channels produced, reproduced through communicative 
action, and is the ‘social space’ generated by this action.106 The shared space of a speech 
situation where actors co-operate communicatively constitutes the public sphere, where the 
speakers don’t merely observe each other but afford each other the freedom of speech and 
co-ordinate action from that speech.107 Thus, it is episodic in nature and can be founded in 
almost any space. It can have a physical audience with the ‘occasional or "arranged" 
publics of particular presentations and events, such as theater performances, rock concerts, 
party assemblies, or church congresses’,108 or can be detached from a ‘public's physical 
presence and extend to the virtual presence of scattered readers, listeners, or viewers linked 
by public media’.109 
Citizens are both ‘bearers of the political public sphere and members of society’110 thus the 
public sphere and civil society are sustained by participation: 
‘the institutions and legal guarantees of free and open opinion-formation rest on the 
unsteady ground of the political communication of actors who, in making use of 
them, at the same time interpret, defend, and radicalize their normative content… 
actors who support the public sphere are distinguished by the dual orientation of 
their political engagement: with their programs, they directly influence the political 
system, but at the same time they are also reflexively concerned with revitalizing 
and enlarging civil society and the public sphere as well as with confirming their 
own identities and capacities to act’.111  
For Habermas, Extinction Rebellion would likely be described as a voice within civil 
society as an ‘emergent association…attuned to how societal problems resonate in the 
private life spheres’,112 engaging their audience in the validity claims of their demands and 
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opening spaces for discourse. They are bringing up and defining ‘approaching problems’, 
and proposing ‘possible solutions’, through their alternative value interpretations of 
consensual norms, thus aiming to drive a broad shift and exert ‘specific policies’.113 They 
can have their demands turned into ‘communicative power only after it passes through the 
filters of the institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion- and will-formation and 
enters through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking.’114 In summary Habermas 
would allow XR to articulate their grievance, expand interest in the issue to gain a place on 
the public agenda, create sufficient pressure on decision makers to force the issue onto the 
formal agenda ‘for their serious consideration’,115 in a process geared to reaching societal-
wide consensus. However, does this adequately represent how XR envision their role and 
their politics? 
1.3.2 Rancière: public sphere conceals stage  
According to Habermas, in contemporary Western societies ‘politics has lost its orientation 
and self-confidence before a terrifying background’ of things like ‘ecological limits on 
economic growth’ and ‘increasing disparities in living conditions’. 116 He suspects that 
unrest comes from a sense that ‘radical democracy’ is needed to maintain the rule of law, 
where ‘institutions of freedom’ can be pressed by the public for more democracy. In his 
theory legal subjects ‘enjoy equal individual liberties’ through their ‘political autonomy’; 
when they ‘achieve clarity’ and understanding on common ‘interests and standards’.117 For 
Habermas, basic rights such as freedom of assembly provide the social structure that 
allows for discussion to reach such clarity. An energetic civil society maintains the 
necessary communication structures by making use of legal guarantees of ‘free and open 
opinion-formation’ via the ‘unsteady ground of political communications’.118  Social 
movements within civil society act “offensively” towards the state by bringing up: 
‘issues relevant to the entire society, to define ways of approaching problems, to 
propose possible solutions, to supply new information, to interpret values 
 
113 Ibid., p.370. 
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differently, to mobilize good reasons and criticize bad ones. Such initiatives are 
intended to produce a broad shift in public opinion, to alter the parameters of 
organized political will-formation, and to exert pressure on parliaments, courts, and 
administrations in favor of specific policies’.119 
The potential of the public sphere is broad, providing voices like Extinction Rebellion’s the 
space to criticise governments, reinterpret prevailing norms, and try to influence political 
decision making and will-formation, without taking political power. Extinction Rebellion 
seek to put the influencing power in the hands of citizens in a Citizens’ Assembly, where 
ordinary people make recommendations for politicians to follow on how to respond to the 
climate emergency, even when radical change is required to implement them. Going 
beyond parliamentary politics is necessary, they argue, because ‘the challenges we face 
and the decisions that need to be made are simply too big for our broken parliamentary 
democracy’.120 A Citizens’ Assembly would help avoid the limitations of parliamentary 
politics where politicians are ‘are influenced by corporate lobbyists’ or ‘simply can’t see 
past the next election’.121 Extinction Rebellion are explicit that they do not want political 
power for themselves, however they do want the Citizens’ Assembly to be legally 
constituted. Like a jury, its recommendations would have a legally binding force to be 
adopted by government and laws formed. Whilst Habermas limits actors within the public 
sphere to acquiring influence rather than political power,122 it might be argued that this is 
still consistent with what Extinction Rebellion aim to set up through the Citizens’ 
Assembly. Laws are legitimised through the discourse principle and the law is freely 
signed up to by the community.  
What, therefore, is concealed if Habermas’ theory allows Extinction Rebellion to realise 
their third demand in full? The answer lies in the possible concealments discussed in 
demands one and two. Where Habermas entrusts the protection of the public sphere to the 
‘moments’ when it is ‘mobilised’, 123 Rancière counters that attempts to ‘revitalise politics 
by bringing the citizen closer to the state or the state closer to the citizen indeed offers the 
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simplest alternative to politics: the simple police’.124 Habermas’ protection of the public 
sphere comes from the institutions of law, the very sites where, for Rancière, politics is 
evacuated.  Setting the stage for political debates as the public sphere, formed through 
public opinion, places the dispute within rational discourse and its potential concealments. 
Rancière argues that for the ‘wrong’ to be fully understood it must be discussed within the 
context of where it occurs and in what way a political voice is miscounted. Placing the 
dispute in the public sphere, places it also within common ‘interests and standards’125 that 
Habermas posits constitute the public sphere, therefore subsuming the dispute’s uniqueness 
in consensus: 
‘The utterance thereby completed then finds itself extracted from the speech 
situation in which it functioned naturally. It is placed in another situation in which 
it no longer works, in which it is the object of scrutiny, reduced to the status of an 
utterance in a common language.’126   
Rather than categorising public opinion in the realm of discourse theory and validity 
claims, Rancière offers an alternative definition and setting: 
‘Political public opinion (as distinct from police management of state legitimisation 
processes) is not primarily some network of enlightened minds discussing common 
problems. Rather, it is an informed opinion of a particular kind: an opinion that 
evaluates the very manner in which people speak to each other and how much the 
social order has to speaking and its interpretation’.127 
The value of Rancière’s corrective for Extinction Rebellion’s demand to go ‘beyond 
politics’, is that it offers the important first step in reinterpreting business-as-usual politics; 
an evaluation of the founding concealments on which the stage of public sphere and 
political discussion is set.   
 
124 Rancière, Disagreement, p.31. See footnote n.85. 
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2 The stage of unconcealment 
2.1 Unconcealment 
‘Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always 
the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is never 
a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free insofar as he belongs to the realm of 
destining and so becomes one who listens and hears, and not one who is simply 
constrained to obey’. 
(Martin Heidegger)128  
Rancière intriguingly concludes Chapter 2 of Disagreement with a very Heideggerian 
phrase: ‘politics is not made up of power relationships; it is made up of relationships 
between worlds’.129 Worlds reveal themselves when such relationships exist. When politics 
is actualised through actions of equality there is ‘an opening up of world where argument 
can be received and have an impact – argument about the very existence of such a 
world’.130 Political actors are ‘world openers’ who open up the ‘common’131 ‘worlds where 
the subject who argues is counted as an arguer’, meaning they are not miscounted and can 
offer alternatives to what is currently considered possible.132 Martin Heidegger’s thought 
can be understood in how beings disclose themselves, entities, and worlds.133 Emphasising 
unconcealment’s importance to the disclosure of being, Heidegger explains that 
‘unconcealment begins’ when the ‘first thinker’ asks ‘what are beings?’134 When 
‘presencing’ or ‘disclosure is at play’ there can be ‘an enduring coming forth from 
concealment into unconcealment’.135 He connects in the process of disclosure the 
 
128 Heidegger, M. 1977, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, The question concerning technology, and 
other essays, Harper Perennial, London;New York, pp.3-35. 
129 Rancière, Disagreement, p.42.  
130 Ibid., p.56. 
131 ‘Common’ means shared language, stage and understanding of wrong, not liberal consensus. 
132 Rancière, Disagreement, p.58 
133 Wrathall argues that Heidegger’s ‘thought as a whole can profitably be seen as working out the 
implications of the original understanding of unconcealment’. Wrathall, Unconcealment, p.2. 
134 Heidegger, M. & McNeill, W. 1998, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, Pathmarks, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge; New York, p.145. 
135 Ibid., p.33. 
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concealment (Verborgenheit) of everyday das Man to its ‘coming forth’136 into 
unconcealment (Unverborgenheit or Alêtheia),137 where the later emerges from the 
former.138 Heidegger therefore offers us a deeper understanding of concealment as an 
essential part of being, but also that in moments of disclosure, unconcealment is possible.  
In Heidegger’s seminal work Being and Time, he compares concealment and 
unconcealment through his study of ‘truth’.139 ‘Being-true’ is to ‘let beings be seen in their 
unconcealment (discoveredness), taking them out of their concealment’.140 Through 
discovery or understanding, being ‘steps forward’ out of concealment and into the ‘light’ 
of the unconcealment of its being;141 ‘when there is a disclosure of being of what and how 
it is, there is a happening of truth at work’.142 But ‘for those who do not understand, what 
they do is remain in concealment’: ‘they forget’.143 Whereas, ‘unconcealment consists in 
bringing things to awareness,…creating the context within which things can be what they 
are’.144 For something to be unconcealed it must first be concealed: ‘all revealing belongs 
with a harbouring concealment’.145 ‘Every uncoveredness of the world…occurs together 
with the concealing of entities’146 and ‘the specific nature of uncoveredness of entities 
needs to be understood as a privation of the of the fundamental covered-up-ness’ of 
entities.147 Heidegger states ‘only where unconcealment already holds sway can something 
become sayable, visible, showable, capable of being apprehended’.148 The concealedness 
 
136 Heidegger, M. 2002. ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger: Off the beaten track, Cambridge 
University Press, pp.1-55. 
137 Wrathall cites a passage from Heidegger’s Seminare: ‘Alêtheia means, translated literally: 
unconcealment. Yet little is gained with literalness… Alêtheia does not mean “truth”, if by that one 
means the validity of assertions in the form of propositions. It is possible that what is to be thought in 
alêtheia, speaking strictly for itself, does not yet have anything to do with “truth” whereas it has 
everything to do with unconcealment, which is presupposed in every determination of “truth”’. 
Wrathall, Unconcealment, p.6.   
138 Wrathall explains that concealment is the ‘positive term’ that needs to be understood first in 
Heidegger’s thinking, as it is ‘given priority’ to unconcealment. Wrathall, Unconcealment. 
139 Heidegger describes ‘truth’ as ‘the still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings’. 
Heidegger, Pathmarks. 
140 Heidegger, Martin, Stambaugh, Joan & Schmidt, Dennis J. (eds.) (2010). Being and Time: A Revised 
Edition of the Stambaugh Translation. State University of New York Press, p.210:219. 
141 Ibid., p.211:219. 
142 Heidegger, ‘The Origin’, p.16. 
143 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.211:219. 
144 Wrathall, Unconcealment, p.2. 
145 Heidegger, ‘The Question’, p.25. 
146 Wrathall, Unconcealment, pp.1-2 and p.23.  
147 Ibid., p.25. 
148 Heidegger, ‘Hegel and the Greeks’, Pathmarks, p.335. 
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of things is ‘the source and foundation of all unconcealedness or truth (alētheia)’.149 This 
chapter, therefore, explores both the concealment ‘that is the very heart of coming into 
appearance’,150 and the unconcealment from which it emerges. My aim is to ‘participate in 
unconcealment, bringing it to our awareness. Heightening our sensitivity and 
responsiveness to it’151 to create a ‘space of possibilities’.152 To bring about a Heideggerian 
unconcealment, requires a movement from ‘forgetting’ to understanding, disclosure, or 
discoveredness.  
2.2 Rancière’s unconcealment 
An alternative way to understand Rancière’s critique of consensus, and what it conceals, is 
as an exposition of his counter-concept ‘dissensus’. This section aims to set out ‘dissensus’ 
as Rancière’s mode of ‘unconcealment’; a connection between Rancièrian and 
Heideggerian terminology that is not ordinarily made within literature about the theorists 
and is consequently this thesis’ major contribution.153 ‘Dissensus’, Rancière argues, is an 
aesthetic disruption to what is commonly accepted and visible within consensus. It is an 
understanding of ‘politics’ that:  
‘breaks with the sensory self-evidence of the 'natural' order that destines specific 
individuals and groups to occupy positions of rule or of being ruled, assigning them 
 
149 Heidegger, M. 1977, ‘The Turning’, The question concerning technology, and other essays, Harper 
Perennial, London;New York, pp.36-48,p.36 fn2. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Wrathall, Unconcealment, p.5. 
152 Ibid., p.14. 
153 There is an interesting comparison between Heidegger’s ‘unconcealment’ and Rancière’s 
‘dissensus’, however this is not commonly identified in the relevant secondary literature, see Wrathall, 
Unconcealment and Corcoran, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, Dissensus. This is perhaps because Rancière 
himself does not directly engage with Heidegger’s work in his key texts Dissensus and Disagreement. 
However, see McFadden, Dan, 2016, ‘The Figure Function in Rancière and Heidegger’, World Picture, 
Journal 11 Summer 2016, http://www.worldpicturejournal.com/WP_11/pdfs/McFadden_WP_11.pdf  
for connections between Rancière and Heidegger on art. For Heidegger, concealment and 
unconcealment occur together and one doesn’t replace the other. Equally for Rancière, dissensus does 
not overcome consensus, rather it exists with it and drives a wedge between and into consensus, 
disrupting consensus’ distribution of the sensible. I think Heidegger would consider it against our 
nature to maintain a disposition of unconcealment without the prior concealment, or to seek to 
eliminate consensus for the unfamiliar possibilities of dissensus. It is from this understanding of 
Heidegger and Rancière that I consider the politics of Extinction Rebellion to exist in moments of 
unconcealing dissensus. 
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to private or public lives, pinning them down to a certain time and space, to specific 
'bodies', that is to specific ways of being, seeing and saying’.154  
Dissensus disorders the ‘distribution of the sensible’155 of people and place that occurs 
within consensus; it disrupts the way consensus visibly presents the assumptions of what is 
commonly shared within society, and what is deemed universal. With overtones of 
Heidegger’s distinction between concealment and unconcealment, Rancière describes 
dissensus as ‘appearance’:  
‘Appearance, particularly political appearance, does not conceal reality but in fact 
splinters it, introduces contentious objects into it, objects whose mode of 
presentation is not homogenous with the ordinary mode of existence of the objects 
thereby identified’.156 
The unconcealing quality of dissensus exists in the way a ‘contentious object’ is introduced 
into, and splintering, consensus’ ‘homogenous’ presentation of the sum of the parts of the 
community: dissensus brings into appearance that which is not counted. Dissensus is a 
‘scene that is liable to emergence anywhere at any time’, resulting in an ‘organisation of 
the sensible in which there is no hidden appearances, or a unique regime of presentation of 
the given imposing its self-evidence on everyone’.157  
A political scene, for Rancière, is not one that is focused on influencing prevailing norms 
or consensual logic but one that brings together two heterogenous logics: an egalitarian 
logic and the logic of the police:  
‘Political subjectification is an ability to produce these polemical scenes, these 
paradoxical scenes, that bring out the contradiction between two logics, by positing 
 
154 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes’, p. 140. 
155 Rancière’s concept ‘distribution of the sensible’ is defined by Rockhill as ‘the implicit law governing 
the sensible order that parcels and forms the partition in a common world by first establishing the 
modes of perception within which these are inscribed. The distribution of the sensible thus produces a 
system of self-evident facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible 
and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done’. Rockhill, Gabriel, 2004, ‘Glossary of 
Technical Terms’, Rancière, Jacques, The Politics of the Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, Pbk. 
edn, Continuum, London; New York, p.85. 
156 Rancière, Disagreement, p.104. 
157 Rancière & Corcoran, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, Dissensus, p.7. 
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existences that are at the same time non-existences – or existences that are at the 
same time existences’.158 
By bringing together two worlds in a polemical scene, politics brings appearance to the 
wrong where voices are given no account. When those who ‘have no right to be counted as 
speaking beings make themselves of some account’, come together, and set up a 
‘community’, they create a ‘confrontation’ and ‘contradiction’ between two worlds: their 
own world where their voice is of account and a world ‘where there is nothing’. 159  
Rancière offers an example of a scene that conceives the existence of a non-existence, 
whereby reconfiguring the stage, a voice emerges as counting. Jeanne Deroin in 1849 
presents herself as a candidate for a legislative election in which she cannot run: ‘she 
reveals herself and she reveals the subject of “women” as necessarily included in…the 
equality of all before the law yet being at the same time radically excluded’.160  The 
polemical scene shows that whilst Deroin cannot run for office, her action reimagines a 
reality where she could because she behaves as if nothing is stopping her. For Rancière, 
this is an exemplar of politics’ achievement, as it:  
‘shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes the place’s destination. It 
makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where 
once there was only place for noise’.161 
It is a scene of contradiction that brings a ‘staging of the very contradiction between police 
logic and political logic which is at the heart of the republican definition of community’,162 
bringing an appearance to two orders: ‘between the order of inegalitarian distribution of 
social bodies in a partition of the perceptible and the order of the equal capacity of 
speaking beings in general’.163   
 
158 Rancière, Disagreement, p.41. 
159 Ibid., p.27. 
160 Ibid., p.41. 
161 Ibid., p.30. 
162 Ibid., p.41. 
163 Ibid., p.42. 
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The formula that dissensus as unconcealment follows is demonstrating that there is not a ‘a 
single regime of presentation and interpretation of the given imposing its obviousness on 
all’:164  
‘Politics invents new forms of collective enunciation; it re-frames the given by 
inventing new ways of making sense of the sensible, new configurations between 
the visible and the invisible, and between the audible and the inaudible, new 
distributions of space and time - in short, new bodily capacities.’165 
Scenes that demonstrate alternative possibilities can be taken up by an audience in their 
own unique situation. In Disagreement, Rancière explains how Ballanche’s reinterpretation 
of the scene on the Aventine was published in 1829 and the July Revolution in Paris broke 
out, which was then followed by a whole series of social movements. The workers who 
adopted Ballanche’s reinterpretation, did so in their own way. Unlike the plebs they were 
not miscounted as speaking beings. The workers’ dispute argued that their political voice 
should be seen in connection with their role as worker, exposing their employer’s 
assumption that work and politics could not share the same stage. Despite this difference, 
Rancière sees the movements as following a “general rule” that the quarrel always ‘bears 
on the prejudicial question: is there any call for the common world of speaking on this 
subject to be set up?’.166 The proletarian movements took up the same form as the scene 
described by Ballanche, they brought appearance to the wrong and aimed to set up the 
common stage on which both parties belong: 
‘The names of the actors, sets, and props might change, but the rule remains the 
same. It consists of creating a stage around any specific conflict on which the 
equality or inequality as speaking beings of the partners in the conflict can be 
played out’.167 
There is a clear theatrical element to Rancière’s politics; a motif that offers an 
understanding of how politics stages unconcealment: 
 
164 Rancière, J., Elliott, G. & ProQuest (Firm), 2011, The Emancipated Spectator, Verso, London, p.2. 
165 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes’, p.139. 
166 Rancière, Disagreement, p.51. 
167 Ibid. 
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‘Subjects whose voices were unheard, whose bodies were not seen, suddenly 
appear to the other social protagonists. As they burst onto the scene, society must 
deal with them and their demands’.168 
By emphasising the theatrical sense of the scene of ‘performing or playing’ and ‘setting it 
up as theatre, inventing the argument’, Rancière shows that the unconcealing nature of 
politics is to bring appearance to the wrong, by bursting ‘on the scene’, and in doing so 
create the potential for it to be picked up by others.169  
It is in The Emancipated Spectator that Rancière fully develops the role of the audience 
and the way they adopt their own political action through their spectatorship.170  Rancière 
posits that there is a prejudice within theatre theory that considers speech and listening as 
the opposite to action. He counters this summation by disputing the existence of a 
distinction between viewing and acting; it is in this revised formula where spectatorship 
can be considered active participation in which he aims to liberate the spectator: 
‘Emancipation begins…when we understand that viewing is also action that 
confirms or transforms this distribution of positions. The spectator also acts…She 
observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links what she sees to a host of other 
things that she has seen on other stages, in other kinds of place…She participates in 
the performance by refashioning it in her own way –…with a story which she has 
read or dreamt, experienced or invented’.171  
Rancière argues that spectatorship can have a politically active quality, denouncing 
assumptions of the passivity of spectatorship. There is an active and creative quality to the 
spectator’s interpretation of the ‘performance’, and the reinterpretation through their own 
‘story’ can be of present prevailing consensus, wrong experienced, and future 
potentialities.  Evocative of his critique of rational discourse’s binary outcomes of 
agreement or disagreement, ‘a choice between the enlightenment of rational 
 
168 Deranty, Jean-Philippe. 2003, 'Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology', Theory & Event, vol. 
6/no. 4, pp. 0-0. 
169 Rancière, Disagreement, p.88. 
170 Rancière, Emancipated Spectator. 
171 Ibid., p.13. 
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communication and the murkiness of inherent violence or irreducible difference’, he argues 
‘images of art do not supply weapons for battle’, 172 but they: 
‘help sketch new configurations of what can be seen, what can be said and what can 
be thought and, consequently, a new landscape of the possible. But they do so on 
condition that their meaning or effect is not anticipated’.173  
The emancipatory potential comes from the reinterpretation and ‘new configurations’ 
applied by the spectator. The dramaturg cannot assume that any message they intend will 
be interpreted with a homogenous meaning by the audience. The audience will interpret the 
play with their own stories and background of understanding. 
The ‘collective power’ of the spectator does not come from their participation in a shared 
consensual interpretation, but of each translating the work in their own way; it is this that 
gives each spectator their emancipatory capacity, their capacity to reinterpret from the 
artistic image the world anew: 
‘What our performances – be they teaching or playing, speaking or writing, making 
art or looking at it – verify is not our participation in a power embodied in the 
community. It is the capacity of anonymous people, the capacity that makes 
everyone equal to everyone else…It is in this power of associating and dissociating 
that the emancipation of the spectator consists – that is to say, the emancipation of 
each of us as spectator’.174 
When the spectator ‘appropriates’ the story and makes it their own in a ‘self-initiated 
democratic outburst’ the potential for dissensus rather than enforced consensus is created. 
The story creates the potential for a moment of re-interpreting an alternative future. The 
unconcealing power of the stage production exists in its potential to be re-interpreted, not 
its power to influence.  If the theatrical disruption is successful in reconfiguring ‘the 
landscape of what can be seen and what can be thought’, as well as to question any 
 
172 Ibid., p.43. 
173 Ibid., p.103. 
174 Ibid., p.17. 
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presumption of who has capacity for perceiving and reinterpreting and who does not, then 
the audience may ‘sketch a new topography of the possible’.175  
2.3 Brecht’s unconcealment 
‘Give us some light on the stage, electrician. How can we 
Playwrights and actors put forward 
Our view of the world in half-darkness. The dim twilight 
Induces sleep. But we need the spectator’s 
Wakeful-, even watchfulness’. 
(Bertolt Brecht)176 
In The Emancipated Spectator, Rancière questions modern theatre theorists, who argue 
that the role of theatre is to close the gap between actor and spectator by engaging them in 
political action. These theorists, Rancière argues, criticise the distance and separation that 
exists between stage and the audience, ‘between the performance of bodies on the stage 
and the passivity of the spectators in the theatre’.177 The critique of the ‘spectacle’178 runs 
as follows: 
‘according to the accusers, being a spectator is a bad thing for two reasons. First, 
viewing is the opposite of knowing: the spectator is held before an appearance in a 
state of ignorance about the process of production of this appearance and about the 
reality it conceals. Second, it is the opposite of acting: the spectator remains 
 
175 Ibid., p.103. 
176 Brecht, Bertolt cited in Willett, J. 1977, The theatre of Bertolt Brecht: a study from eight aspects, Rev. 
/ [with a revis bibliography]. edn, Methuen Drama, London, p.161. 
177 Ibid., p.103.  
178 Rancière illustrates the argument he is countering by citing Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle 
and the formula that for the spectating man ‘the more he contemplates the less he lives’. Debord, G. 
1994, The society of the spectacle, Zone Books, New York, N.Y, p.23 cited in Rancière, Emancipated 
Spectator, p.6. 
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immobile in her seat, passive. To be a spectator is to be separated from both the 
capacity to know and the power to act’.179 
For Rancière, we should not assume that watching is the same as being passive, but 
recognise the active nature of watching by interpretation, constituting the potential for 
political action. Further, there is nothing inherently wrong with spectating. Spectating has 
emancipatory potential, and far from being passive, if engaged in re-interpretation of 
consensus logic, can be considered active participation: 
‘We do not have to transform spectators into actors, and ignoramuses into scholars. 
We have to recognize the knowledge at work in the ignoramus and the activity 
peculiar to the spectator. Every spectator is already an actor in her story; every 
actor, every man of action, is the spectator of the same story’.180 
Setting up speech and listening as the opposite of action is an ‘a priori distribution of the 
position and capacities and incapacities attached to these positions’.181 The emancipatory 
potential of the audience lies in their capability to be ‘narrators and translators’, 
reinterpreting consensual modes of understanding and unconcealing their own stories. 
Rancière identifies Brecht as a prime example of a dramaturg who takes issue with the gap 
between stage/actor and audience, and addresses ‘the evil’ of a passive spectator by 
creating a new relationship where ‘drama means action’.182 Arguably Rancière incorrectly 
attributes such a claim to Brecht. Augusto Boal aligns more closely to Rancière’s critique, 
as he explicitly denounces spectator as ‘a bad word’, who ‘is less than a man and it is 
necessary to humanise him, to restore to him his capacity for action in all its fullness’.183 
Boal’s ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’ is a set of dramatic techniques, the purpose of which is 
to bring to light systemic exploitation and oppression within common situations, and to 
allow spectators to become actors in unconcealing solutions to the oppression.184 The 
‘spect-actor’ restores the audience to their capacity for action, demonstrating that the stage 
 
179 Ibid., p.2. 
180 Ibid., p.17. 
181 Ibid., p.14. 
182 Ibid., p.3. 
183 Boal, Augusto, 1979, The Theatre of the Oppressed, London: Pluto Press, cited in White, G. 2013, 
Audience participation in theatre: aesthetics of the invitation, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.20. 
184 Coudray, Sophie, 2017, ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’, Culture Matters, 
https://culturematters.org.uk/index.php/arts/theatre/item/2455-the-theatre-of-the-oppressed. 
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can be changed to become the space for unconcealing new possibilities. Bertolt Brecht’s 
critique is that ‘Operatic’ theatre of the time makes insufficient demands of the audience, 
allowing its audience to ‘just come for fun’, to merely be entertained where they ‘don’t 
hesitate to keep their hats on in the theatre’:185  
‘their eyes are open, but they stare rather than see, just as they listen rather than 
hear…This detached state, where they seem to be given over to vague but profound 
sensations, grows deeper the better the work of the actors, and so we do not 
approve of this situation, should like them be as bad as possible’.186  
Brecht explains that he structures and presents his theatre ‘badly’ ‘so that the audience can 
think for itself. That’s why I need a quick-witted audience that knows how to observe, and 
gets its enjoyment from setting its reason to work’.187 His theatre makes an appeal to the 
audience’s reason, meaning he believes they have the capacity to engage in the issues of 
the day. ‘Dramatic’ or ‘Operatic’ theatre188 ‘implicates the spectator in a stage situation’ 
and ‘wears down his capacity for action’. 189 By comparison ‘Epic Theatre’, the mode he 
advocates, ‘turns the spectator into an observer’, and ‘arouses his capacity for action’.190 
The essential point of Epic Theatre is ‘that it appeals less to the feelings than to the 
spectator’s reason’.191 Epic Theatre does not try to close the gap between audience and 
spectator, but bring its audience to ‘the point of recognition’ where the ‘the spectator 
stands outside, studies’.192 Rancière describes the role that critical art can play in engaging 
a ‘watchful’ audience: 
‘Critical art is an art that aims to produce a new perception of the world, and 
therefore to create a commitment to its transformation. This schema, very simple in 
appearance, is actually the conjunction of three processes: first, the production of a 
sensory form of 'strangeness'; second, the development of an awareness of the 
 
185 Brecht, Bertolt, 1974, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, Willet, John (ed.) (trans.), 
second edition, Methuen, London, p.14. 
186 Ibid., pp.179-205. 
187 Ibid., p.14. 
188 Brecht uses the terms ‘Dramatic’ and ‘Operatic Theatre’ interchangeably as the theatre that he seeks 
to counter with Epic Theatre. 
189 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p.37. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Brecht cited in Willett, Brecht, p. 168. 
192 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 37.  
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reason for that strangeness and third, a mobilization of individuals as a result of that 
awareness’.193 
‘Epic Theatre’ is an example of such ‘critical art’ as it creates a sensory form of 
‘strangeness’ that develops awareness for its audience, as Brecht explains: 
‘The production took the subject-matter and the incidents shown and put them 
through a process of alienation: the alienation that is necessary to all understanding. 
When something seems ‘the most obvious thing in the world’ it means that any 
attempt to understand the world has been given up’.194 
To fulfil Rancière’s first process in the schema, a relationship of strangeness or alienation 
is needed so that the audience do not take anything for granted and remain curious. Brecht 
argues that when something seems ‘obvious’ to the audience, they have given up trying to 
understand it. This means that to fulfil Rancière’s second and third processes in the 
schema, the theatre must challenge the audience’s interpretations of what is obvious; to 
ensure both an awareness of the reason for the alienation and the potential to mobilise the 
audience. 
Brecht explains, in the following passages, the difference between what the Dramatic 
Theatre and Epic Theatre audience say: 
‘The dramatic theatre’s spectator says: … - It’s only natural - It’ll never change – 
The sufferings of this man appal me, because they are inescapable – That’s great 
art; it all seems the most obvious thing in the world’. 
‘The epic theatre’s audience says: … - That’s extraordinary, hardly believable – It’s 
got to stop – The sufferings of this man appal me, because they are unnecessary – 
That’s great art: nothing obvious in it’.195 
The Dramatic Theatre audience recognises that suffering exists but accepts this as obvious; 
whilst they sympathise do not feel like they can act. Therefore, the distinction is not a 
 
193 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes’, p.142. 
194 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p.58. 
195 Ibid., p.71. 
Page 2-41 of 90 
 
 
blindness to suffering but that the Epic Theatre audience recognise the suffering must stop; 
fulfilling Rancière’s schema, they are committed to a ‘transformation’. Brecht’s 
commitment in his Epic Theatre is to incite this determination to change the world, and the 
mode through which he aims to achieve this is his alienation effect. An example is Brecht’s 
famous theoretical ‘street scene’ staging the audience as witness to an accident. Rather 
than draw the audience into the experience of the characters causing the accident or 
witnessing it, the audience should be left to their own role as objective bystander so that 
they can form an opinion of the accident of their own, becoming in Rancière’s words a 
‘translator’ of the scene. The street scene ‘forced the spectator to look at the play’s 
situation from such an angle that they necessarily became subject to his criticism’.196 
Brecht, in agreement with Rancière, sees the potential of the audience as spectator to 
engage in ‘free discussion’, where the theatre becomes ‘organs of mass communication’.197 
To engage in the ‘organ of communication’, offered by Brecht’s Epic Theatre, ‘the 
audience can no longer have the illusion of being the unseen spectator at an event which is 
really taking place’.198 Operatic Theatre creates an illusion that the audience is part of the 
narrative unfolding, ‘which helps conceal the fact that the scenes are so arranged that the 
audience can view them in the easiest way’.199 Easy, because the illusion of Operatic 
Theatre ‘can move the feelings of their audience so much more strongly than does the 
world itself’.200 There is a concealment to be unconcealed. Brecht’s mode of 
unconcealment is his concept of Verfremdungseffeckt, often translated as alienation effect 
or V-effect; a means by which ‘an effect of estrangement could be got’ for the audience, 
‘to show everything in a fresh and unfamiliar light, so that the spectator is brought to look 
critically even at what he has so far taken for granted’.201 Brecht illustrates that:  
‘To see one’s mother as a man’s wife one needs a V-Effekt; this is provided, for 
example, when one acquires a stepfather. If one sees one’s form-master hounded by 
 
196 Ibid., p.121. 
197 Ibid., pp.39,42. 
198 Ibid., p.92. 
199 Ibid., p.92. 
200 Ibid., pp.179-205. 
201 Willett, Brecht, p.177. 
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baillifs a V-Effekt occurs: one is jerked out of a relationship in which the form-
master seems big into one where he seems small’.202 
The ‘jerk’203 is created by Brecht’s theatrical techniques such as the actors speaking 
directly to the audience, projections that contradict what is occurring on the stage by 
showing the production’s meaning or lighting that shines on the apparatus of the stage. 
These techniques illuminate that the stage of the narrative has been constructed for 
representation to the audience. Brecht describes how his lighting techniques effect the 
audience: 
‘There is a point in showing the lighting apparatus openly, as it is one of the means 
of preventing an unwanted element of illusion; it scarcely disturbs the necessary 
concentration. If we light the actors and their performance in such a way that the 
lights themselves are within the spectators’ field of vision, we destroy part of their 
illusion of being present at a spontaneous, transitory, authentic, unrehearsed event. 
They see that arrangements have been made to show something; something is being 
repeated here under special conditions, for instance, in a very brilliant light. 
Displaying the actual lights is meant to be a counter to the old-fashioned theatre’s 
efforts to hide them’.204 
By exposing the lighting to the audience, Brecht is revealing that theatre typically creates 
an illusion that the narrative is spontaneous and unrehearsed, meaning that what is 
concealed from the audience is the events on stage are being presented to them in a 
particular way. The illusion is ‘unwanted’ because Brecht wants the audience to be able to 
take the position of critical observer. The audience should engage in the conversation 
themselves, without any inbuilt assumptions, bias, or pre-existing interpretations of the 
events.  
Now that we understand how Brecht’s jolt is achieved, how does the audience come ‘out of 
a relationship’ where, for example, ‘the form-master seems big into one where he seems 
small’? Alienation, or estrangement from a thing or point of view, demands a 
 
202 Brecht cited in Willett, Brecht, p.177. 
203 For my purposes I will swap the word ‘jerked’ with jolted or jolt as a preferred way of describing 
the physical transformation towards awareness and awakening resulting from Brecht’s alienation 
effect. This is not intended as a correction of the translation of the German original. 
204 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 141. 
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reinterpretation of it, as it is made to feel unfamiliar and capable of being experienced in a 
new light:  
‘What is involved here is, briefly, a technique of taking the human social incidents 
to be portrayed and labelling them as something striking, something that calls for 
explanation, is not to be taken for granted, not just natural. The object of this 
‘effect’ is to allow the spectator to criticise constructively from a social point of 
view’.205  
As theatre had typically tried to bring the audience into the narrative and the emotional 
journey of the characters’ arc, it concealed the staging and presentation involved by hiding 
from sight what creates this illusion such as stage lighting. By exposing these artifices, 
exposing the process of the ‘showing’, Brecht aims to raise the potential of his theatre 
‘above the level of the everyday, the obvious the expected (i.e. the estranged)’.206 Brecht’s 
objective, by removing what is taken-for-granted, is that the audience can make the 
‘reasoned’ leap that illusions of life, the assumptions built into the common sense, are, like 
the stage, only human creations and changeable: 
‘The V-effect consists in turning the object of which we are to be made aware, to 
which our attention is to be drawn, from something ordinary, familiar, immediately 
accessible, into something peculiar, striking and unexpected. The obvious is in a 
certain sense made incomprehensible, but this is only in order that it may then be 
made all the easier to comprehend. Before familiarity can turn into awareness, the 
familiar must be stripped of its inconspicuousness; we must give up assuming that 
the object in question needs no explanation’.207 
The V-effect can be extended beyond making a familiar stage or dramatic narrative feel 
unfamiliar to the everyday, to also making these everyday frames of understanding feel 
‘incomprehensible’. Alienation not only exposes the ‘process of showing’ for the audience 
 
205 Ibid., p.125. In chapter three, I argue that the theatrical scenes of disruption adopted by Extinction 
Rebellion as a political technique, are examples of Brecht’s alienation effect. Further, like Brecht, 
Extinction Rebellion aim to allow their spectators to criticise the inaction of government and society in 
the face of the climate emergency as something ‘striking’ that should not be ‘taken for granted’.  
206 Brecht cited in Willett, Brecht, p.178. 
207 Brecht, B., Silberman, M., Giles, S. & Kuhn, T. 2018, Brecht on theatre, Third / by Marc Silberman, 
Steve Giles and Tom Kuhn. edn, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, pp.192-193. 
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but confronts the audience with a feeling of how the comfortable forms of entertainment or 
life are inadequate. Brecht illustrates this with a scenario where a business meeting starts 
with the question: ‘Have you ever considered what happens to the waste from your factory 
that is pumped into the river day in, day out?’208  The question sheds light on something 
unobserved or taken for granted. It draws attention to the disposal of the waste into the 
river, a process facilitated by man-made engineering. Brecht would expect this level of 
enquiry from an Epic Theatre audience where the alienation effect had successfully 
awoken them from an everyday frame of recognition. Without a questioning audience the 
disposal of the waste remains ‘inconspicuous’, with no need of explanation: its 
everydayness is concealed. The unconcealing power of the V-effect is that it asks the 
audience to look at things anew, and in doing so show the potential for an alternative 
interpretation. The V-effect can be used to challenge what is taken for granted by 
suggesting: ‘You might have thought that … but you oughtn’t to have thought it’.209 
Connoting another thought is possible, the spectator is invited to confront the frames of 
concealment in the stage production itself, the subject matter the play depicts, and their 
own world. Like Rancière’s Emancipated Spectator, Brecht’s audience is given the space 
to ‘participate in the performance by refashioning it in her own way –…with a story which 
she has read or dreamt, experienced or invented’.210   
2.4 Heidegger’s unconcealment 
‘Freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and lighted up, i.e., of the revealed’. 
(Martin Heidegger)211  
Brecht’s V-effect presents the familiar in a new light so that it feels unfamiliar and requires 
questioning from a critical observer. He critiques ‘Operatic Theatre’ as reinforcing the-
taken-for-granted familiar interpretations, by leaving what is presented on stage as 
‘unalterable’ and wearing down the audience’s power for action. This account begs the 
question of how ingrained the ‘immediately accessible’ interpretation is for the audience, 
and what it will take to jolt the audience to a new awareness? Does the ‘process of 
 
208 Brecht, 2018, Brecht on theatre, p.193. 
209 Ibid.  
210 Rancière, Emancipated Spectator, p.13. 
211 Heidegger, ‘The Question’, p.25. 
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showing’ hinder the audience’s ability to take up the opportunity of reinterpretation and 
participation ‘in unconcealment’? How can something previously taken-for-granted be 
disrupted, now open for new interpretations, be brought to the audience’s ‘awareness’, 
heightening their ‘sensitivity and responsiveness to it’?212 To address these questions, we 
return to the concealment or coveredness of things that, as Heidegger explains, occurs 
before and with unconcealment. We return to Heidegger to evaluate how concealment is 
engrained in being but also how moments of unconcealment can emerge from prevailing 
concealments. Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of being helps us understand how 
Brecht’s audience213 most commonly show up as an ‘Operatic’ rather than an ‘Epic’ 
audience. He offers an understanding of how a disruption or breakdown event created by 
the ‘Epic’ dramaturg can help shift the audience from being ‘worn down’ from action to 
‘aroused’ for it. Further, Heidegger adds to the audience the capacity and motivation of 
‘care’ that is missing in Brecht, as Brecht requires the dramaturg to present a political 
wrong or ‘street scene’ for the audience to respond to and reinterpret. First, I aim to set out 
the concealments that occur in his account of everyday being, second his own jolt to 
everyday mode of understanding through his concept of breakdown, before his concept of 
authenticity allows for an understanding of things as unsettled, which in turn ‘clears’214 the 
space for new frames of interpretation. Heidegger’s analysis of concealment in 
everydayness is characterised by his argument that modernity’s technological ‘way of 
revealing’ the world means that all possibilities emerge from the understanding of things as 
mere resource; all other modes of disclosing the world are concealed.215 However, 
breakdown moments can disrupt everyday inauthentic understanding, clearing a space for 
authentic possibilities where the world is not seen as resource. Navigating the path through 
Heidegger’s assessment of how concealment prevails is necessary to understand how, 
when there is a breakdown that disrupts the everyday, unconcealment can emerge. Works 
 
212 Wrathall, Unconcealment, p.5. 
213 We will see why Heidegger’s analysis of ‘concealment’ and ‘unconcealment’ is so important to 
Extinction Rebellion’s understanding of their audience in chapter three. 
214 See footnote n.14 for a definition of the term ‘clearing’. 
215 ‘Technology’, for Heidegger, represents the essence of modernity: as the way that holds sway of 
revealing, understanding, and disclosing. The technological age places all things, including Dasein, in 
‘standing-reserve’, meaning that Dasein relates to everything as resource. For example, a forester is in 
standing-reserve for the print industries that rely on trees as paper. The threat of technology is its 
essence, as it limits the disclosing or revealing potential of humanity to understanding things as 
anything other than resource. Heidegger, ‘The Question’. 
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of art or ‘festival’216 (Ereignis events217), are revealing happenings in which beings show 
up as the beings that they are, and we experience the world with ‘wonder’ that we 
ourselves are ‘in the midst of’,218 making possible an epochal shift from technological 
disclosure to disclosing possibilities of authentic219 care220. This section, therefore, aims to 
demonstrate how we can, in moments, step out of the concealment of the drab everyday 
and into the unconcealment of wonder and celebration of the world and life. 
Heidegger’s Being and Time is a study of our understanding of being, with phenomenology 
providing the philosophical framework of his inquiries into everyday human life. In it, he 
made a significant intervention into a philosophical tradition that has understood human 
experience through a subject-object model laid down by Descartes. The cartesian 
philosophical tradition identifies humans as thinking beings, subjects engaged in the 
thinking about the objects and circumstances that confront them, and with which they 
engage. For Heidegger, inner and outer, subject and object, leads to incorrect conclusions 
of the descriptions of how we experience things. Unlike Descartes, Heidegger argues our 
everyday experience comes from being-in-the-world and consequently is one of 
familiarity; of being with others and engaging with things. Heidegger’s account of 
Dasein221 is an exploration of beings where their being is of concern, as opposed to beings 
where their being is of no concern. The key characteristic that makes us human, is that our 
 
216 Julian Young explains that Heidegger interchanges ‘the festival’ with ‘the artwork’, with both terms 
representing ‘the ecstacic state – ecstatic in both the ordinary sense and in the literal sense of ‘standing 
out from’ the ordinary – in which everyday experience of the world is transformed into something 
quite different’. Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, p.58. 
217 ‘Ereignis’ is both a concealing and unconcealing event that Heidegger phrases as the ‘clearing-
concealing’ of Dasein’s being. As a moment, Ereignis is for Dasein both ‘self-disclosing’ and a ‘self-
refusal’ ‘since the clearing of what lies within a horizon is always the concealing of what lies beyond’. 
Young, Later Philosophy, p.25. For a study of Heidegger’s varied use of Ereignis throughout his work see 
Polt, Richard, 2005, ‘Ereignis’, in Dreyfus, H.L., Wrathall, M.A. & ProQuest (Firm), A companion to 
Heidegger, Blackwell Pub, Malden, MA. pp.375 – 391. For my purposes, I have chosen what Polt calls 
the most influential meaning that Heidegger gives the term: a moment where ‘the way in which the 
givenness of given beings – including ourselves – comes into question for us’, p.383. 
218 Young, J. 2001, Heidegger's philosophy of art, Cambridge University Press., Cambridge, p.107. 
219 ‘Authenticity’ (die Eigentlichkeit) is the ‘condition of existence that…is the counter-possibility to 
what [Heidegger] calls “being lost in the Anyone”…owning who and how one is’. Blattner, William, 
2006, Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reader’s Guide, Bloomsbury, London, p.15. 
220 ‘Care’ (Sorge) is a fundamental way of how humans be in the world: they care about things, they 
make use of things, produce things, or attend to things. All these ways of being have ‘care’ as the 
essence of their being.     
221 ‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s term for the being of human beings, the structures that determine humans as 
humans. There are four ontological traits of Dasein: (i) Dasein’s being is in each case mine; (ii) Dasein 
comports itself towards its being; (iii) Dasein is delivered over to its being; (iv) Being is at issue for 
Dasein. Blattner, A Reader’s Guide, p.33.  
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existence matters to us, we care for our own being and we care about our relationship to 
others by being-in-the-world.222 This is the basic form of self-disclosure: I am what matters 
to me. The type of person that we are is defined by the possibilities that we take up and the 
possibilities that we do not, actualizing the ones we pick up and closing off the others. 
Through actualising these possibilities Dasein’s being is disclosed to it. In Disclosing New 
Worlds, Dreyfus and Spinosa study Heideggerian disclosure223 and conclude that essential 
to our being is our relationship to the way that we open-up new possibilities as ‘world 
disclosers’:224 
‘according to Heidegger our nature is to be world disclosers. That is, by means of 
our equipment and coordinated practices we human beings open coherent, distinct 
contexts or worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, and think’.225  
When we co-ordinate with other beings we do so to open-up worlds in which we can act. 
As we do this, we take up (unconceal) some possibilities, and close off (conceal) others.  
Dreyfus and Spinosa focus on our potential to disclose new worlds as history-makers, 
citing as a seminal example Martin Luther King who disclosed a new world of equality. 
However, such brilliance is rare and is not Dasein’s pre-disposed way of disclosing worlds. 
Our pre-disposed way of disclosing worlds is familiarity, as we most commonly interpret 
the world in ways that are familiar to us. This familiarity is constituted by our everyday 
taking care of things. Our shared history and cultural heritage results in a background of 
 
222 We are primordially familiar with the world and cannot be disentangled from it, therefore being-in-
the-world means we are immersed in it. Blattner, A Reader’s Guide, p.14.   
223 ‘Disclosure’ is the meaning of an entity, and the meaning is set within the context that it is 
encountered. Human beings are disclosed and disclose based on the context of the environment and 
situation in which they find themselves. We understand entities through our everyday experience of 
them, in contexts. Disclosure can be of an already pre-defined and interpreted world, but it can also be 
of new horizons of meaning that were previously concealed as they did not have shared and pre-
determined understanding. 
224 ‘World’ is not an object, but that within which entities appear; it is a horizon of appearance. The 
background of pre-defined meaning and understanding that humans share is what forms worlds. 
‘World disclosure’ is a form of comprehension through pre-defined meaning or of new horizons, 
structures, or dimensions of meaning where things become intelligible or meaningful. 
225 Spinosa, Charles, Dreyfus, Hubert L, and Flores, Fernando, 1997, Disclosing New Worlds: 
Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity, The MIT Press and Hubert 
Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa, ‘Further Reflections on Heidegger, Technology and the Everyday’, in 
Kompridis, Nikolas, 2006, ed. Philosophical Romanticism, New York: Routledge, p.265. 
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obviousness, of shared understanding. Heidegger introduces the term das Man,226 
translated as ‘the Anyone’, ‘the One’, or ‘the They’, to represent this shared understanding: 
‘the They, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not the sum, prescribe the 
kind of being of everydayness’.227 Das Man is everyday Dasein; a shared ‘social horizon’ 
that occurs in the ‘everyday’, because beings are inextricably in the world with others.228 
Dasein’s actions are shaped and limited by social normativity, meaning Dasein typically 
takes up possibilities as one takes up possibilities, that are available within the social 
horizon. There is a limiting factor to possibilities through social norms and what is publicly 
available within those norms. 
The public’s ‘everyday’ understanding and intelligibility is defined by a care-structure 
oriented towards social norms and formed by ‘being-with-one-another’229: 
‘Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of being for the they, 
constitute what we know as “publicness”. Publicness initially controls every way in 
which the world and Dasein are interpreted, and it is always right, not because of an 
eminent and primary relation of beings and “things,” not because it has an 
explicitly appropriate transparency of Dasein at its disposal, but because it does not 
get to “the heart of the matter,” because it is insensitive to every difference of level 
and genuineness. Publicness obscures everything, and then claims that what has 
been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everyone’.230 
Das Man exists within the limits of everyday understanding and prevailing interpretations, 
and in turn limits what possibilities show up and can be enacted. The prevailing 
interpretations ‘control’ Dasein’s interpretations and ‘obscures’ everything. This is 
achieved by being general and ‘accessible to everyone’, therefore not getting to the “heart 
of the matter” or being meaningful. The concealing power of ‘the They’ exists in the claim 
 
226 ‘Das Man’ represents inauthentic Dasein, where the possibilities that Dasein acts on are taken up 
because that is what one does, following social norms. 
227 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.123:127. 
228 Blattner, A Reader’s Guide, p.69. Heidegger explains that when Dasein’s mode of disclosure is as das 
Man: ‘we enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge 
literature and art the way they see and judge’. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.123:127. 
229 Human beings are always already ontologically with other humans, meaning that as humans go 
about their business it relates to other humans. For example, as I go about my business as a researcher, 
I relate to other researchers, my teachers, and so on. 
230 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.123-124:127. 
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that what it has covered over was always familiar, thus subsuming everything within itself.  
Through conformity Dasein limits action only to the possible action of the ‘standard 
situation’; most of what one does is done in the standard way of coping and “average 
intelligibility” which in turn ‘fosters generality and banality’.231 The concept of das Man 
denotes a limit to and horizons for what can be seen. Thus, essential to das Man is the 
limiting of possibilities and the preference for taking up ‘banal’ possibilities that are 
publicly available.  
Dasein “initially” and “for the most part” discloses itself in averageness, in the ‘being-
with-one-another of publicness’, meaning that everydayness is a way of being that Dasein 
mainly “suffers” ‘dully’ in.232 Heidegger uses a number of terms to signify how Dasein is 
“for the most part” being-in-the-world in this average way: Dasein’s ‘thrownness’233 is 
everydayness, Dasein ‘falls prey’ to the they, Dasein is ‘lost’ and ‘entangled’234 in being-
with-others.235 Each term denotes falling into something (‘the They’) and falling away 
from something else: ‘Dasein, falling prey, has already fallen away from itself’.236 
Heidegger terms ‘falling prey’ to the They as Dasein’s inauthentic mode of being; a way of 
being ‘which is completely taken in by the world and the Dasein-with of the others in the 
they’.237 Whether, ‘fallen’, ‘lost’, or ‘entangled’ in the world there is a concealing quality 
to the way that Dasein most typically discloses itself. What is concealed is Dasein’s 
alternative mode of being: authenticity. As already explained, the public way of 
interpreting predominates and ‘hold[s] fast to Dasein in its falling prey’, which in turn 
makes claim to ‘having-seen-everything and having-understood-everything’.238 Das Man 
conceals Dasein’s ‘ownmost potentiality of being’ (an authentic way of being) where it 
‘constantly tears understanding away from projecting authentic possibilities, and drags it 
into the tranquilized supposition of possessing or attaining everything’.239  The supposition 
 
231 Dreyfus, H.L. 1991, Being-in-the-world: a commentary on Heidegger's Being and time, division I, MIT 
Press, London; Cambridge, Mass, p.328. 
232 Ibid., p.352-353:370-371. 
233 ‘Thrownness’ illustrates how Dasein finds itself in the world; we are already thrown into the world. 
Further, it denotes the mood in which Dasein discloses the world and projects its possibilities.  
234 ‘Falling prey’, ‘lost’, and ‘entangled’ are inter-changeable terms Heidegger uses to illustrate Dasein’s 
‘thrownness’ to a mood in which possibilities show up within publicly available possibilities; where it 
finds itself lost in the limits of das Man.  
235 Heidegger, Being and Time, s.38. 
236 Ibid., p.169:176. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid., p.170-171:177. 
239 Ibid., p.172:178. 
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that Dasein “understands” everything means it ‘drifts toward an alienation in which its 
ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed. Dasein’s ‘ownmost potentiality 
of being’ is being authentically: ‘ownmost’ because it is not lost in ‘the They’ or limited to 
publicly available possibilities:   
‘Entangled being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing; it is at the 
same time alienating’.240  
By getting ‘tangled up’ in ‘the They’ of das Man, the alienation limits Dasein’s 
possibilities. Like Rancière’s critique of consensus that there is not ‘a single regime of 
presentation and interpretation of the given imposing its obviousness on all’; 241 the 
‘plunge’ into this tangled up state of ‘everydayness’ ‘remains concealed’, subsequently 
Dasein, understanding things in a general way, ‘compares itself with everything’.242 Thus, 
concealing its own concealing process by presenting public possibilities as the only way of 
‘getting ahead’ and ‘living concretely’, subsumes any alternative interpretation.243 Through 
social normativity and conformism das Man covers up any exception to the everyday 
interpretation. 
‘Distantiality’, for Heidegger, is deviance from the social norms of das Man. It is typically 
suppressed in the concealing process of falling prey, to protect the ‘tranquillity’ of 
everydayness.244  Everyday life is cosy and ‘immersed in the sea and drowned by the 
world's suffocating banality’.245 Dasein as das Man has as an essential part of its being a 
dampening down of anything different or exceptional, thus sustaining averageness: 
‘This averageness, which prescribes what can and may be ventured, watches over 
every exception which thrusts itself to the fore. Every priority is noiselessly 
quashed. Overnight, everything that is original is flattened down as something long 
since known. Everything won through struggle becomes something 
 
240 Ibid., p.171:178. 
241 Rancière, Emancipated Spectator, p. 2. 
242 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.171:178. 
243 Ibid. 
244 A simple example offered by Blattner is inappropriate dress for an occasion, where societal norms 
would allow us to point out the deviance and try and suppress it in others and ourselves. Blattner, A 
Reader’s Guide, p.70. 
245 Critchley, Simon, (2009), ‘Being and Time, part 5: Anxiety’, Simon Critchley, Guardian Online, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/06/heidegger-philosophy-being 
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manageable…Every mystery loses its power. The care of averageness reveals, in 
turn, an essential tendency of Dasein, which we call the levelling down of all 
possibilities of being’.246 
‘The they’, ‘in providing average intelligibility, opens up a standard world in which all 
distinctions between the unique and the general, the superior and the average, the 
important and the trivial have been levelled’.247  When Dasein is entangled in das Man and 
levelled possibilities of the public, there is no need to respond to the uniqueness of the 
situation, or interpret it in any way other than what makes sense within the public 
interpretation: 
‘For the they248, however, situation…is essentially closed off. The they knows only 
the “general situation” [“allgemine Lage”], loses itself in the closest 
“opportunities,” and settles its Dasein by calculating the “accidents” which 
misjudges as its own achievements and passes off as such’.249  
Blattner explains that we ‘live to a large extent in a mode that is unowned…we glide 
through life without having to face the question whether to own our lives…Disowned 
Dasein flees in the face of death and anxiety and tries to return to everyday life’.250 
Although Dasein’s preferred mode of being is ‘unowned’, where possibilities are levelled 
down, an alternative exists in the counter-term. An ‘owned’ way of being responds to the 
‘situation’ in its uniqueness, not in a generalised way but by taking up possibilities that are 
typically concealed. Owned possibilities are specific to the demands of the situation and 
specific to Dasein, thus formulating Dasein’s ‘ownmost potentiality of being’.251 
 
246 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.127:123. 
247 Dreyfus, A Commentary, p.320. 
248 Joan Stambaugh translates das Man as ‘the they’ and ‘the they-self’ as opposed to ‘the one’ and ‘the 
one-self’. This is a helpful translation for connoting the sense of das Man’s publicness, how Dasein’s 
existence is being-with others, and how inauthentic and levelled Dasein is shaped by public 
interpretations of the world.   
249 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.287:300. 
250 Heidegger does not offer the distinction between ‘owned’ and ‘unowned’, but Blattner is convincing 
in his argument that the ‘everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein’s averageness’ is neither owned 
nor disowned, leaving the third term ‘unowned’ as a sensible English translation to convey the 
meaning. Blattner, A Reader’s Guide, p.130. 
251 There exists the potential of Dasein being authentic in its understanding of ‘death’ by owning its 
own death. This means Dasein understands the possibility that existence and its possibilities are 
always finite.  
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Heidegger calls this an authentic mode of being, existing with and emerging from everyday 
banalised das Man.    
The purpose of the distinction is to highlight two ways of coping with the ‘uncanniness’252 
or unsettledness of existence.253 Inauthentic being ‘flees’ from, or tries to ‘forget’ about, 
unsettledness. Whereas, authentic being is a way of understanding Dasein’s existence as 
unsettled, standing up to it and owning it.254 Authenticity is how Dasein can ‘find itself’ 
from the ‘lostness’ of being ‘entangled’ in ‘the They’. It is an example of an unoncealment 
emerging from a concealment.255 Heidegger’s term for this is ‘resolute’ Dasein, defined as 
‘authentic disclosedness’, ‘letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in the 
they’.256 Irresoluteness of das Man always ‘remains dominant’257, but resolute Dasein is 
capable of ‘projecting upon definite factical possibilities’ or its ‘ownmost-potentiality-for-
being’, meaning taking up possibilities in the situation that face up to the unsettledness. 
Whilst derived from public possibilities, it is a reinterpretation of das Man’s possibilities:  
‘Resolute, Dasein has brought itself back out of falling prey in order to be all the 
more authentically “there” for the disclosed situation in the “Moment” 
[“Augenblick”]’.258 
Being ‘authentically there’ has ‘an overtone of spatial significance’ as Dasein ‘“makes 
room” for factical existing’.259 Like Rancière’s dissensus acting as a rupture to visible 
consensus, Heidegger’s authentic Dasein accepts something ‘contentious’260 (or distantial) 
into everyday understanding: unsettledness, which is not counted by das Man. Authentic 
Dasein discloses a space for possibilities that are ‘relevant’ to the ‘character of the 
 
252 ‘Uncanniness’ is a potential mood for Dasein, where Dasein does not feel at home; coming about 
when possibilities show up as having the potential to be disturbed and no longer possible. 
253 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 186:192. In chapter three I will discuss Heidegger’s connection 
between unsettledness, anxiety, and death through examples in Extinction Rebellion’s symbolism and 
activism. 
254 Heidegger, Being and Time, s.40. 
255 Ibid., p.257:268. 
256 Ibid., p.257:268, p.258:268. 
257 Ibid., p.286:299. 
258 Ibid., p.313:328. 
259 Ibid., p.286:299. 
260 Rancière, Disagreement, p.104. 
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circumstances’, and ‘summons’ Dasein’s ‘potentiality-of-being’ for ‘concernful taking 
care’.261  
Heidegger intricately weaves connections between his concepts of authenticity, 
resoluteness, and care: 
‘By the entanglement of Dasein, for as falling prey it flees…from itself to the they. 
The “natural” talk about the I takes place in the they-self. What expresses itself in 
the “I” is that self which, initially and for the most part, I am not authentically. 
When one is absorbed in the every-day multiplicity and rapid succession of what is 
taken care of, the self of the self-forgetful “I take care of” shows itself as what is 
constantly and identically simple, but indefinite and empty. One is, after all, what 
one takes care of’.262 
The connection and importance of care (Sorge) for Heidegger is, as Dreyfus summarises, 
that ‘being gets to me’.263 Authentic care is distinct from inauthentic care because in 
inauthentic care, one merely keeps busy with what is around and closes possibilities 
beyond that, Dasein tranquilises the situation’s unsettledness.264 Whereas, when one 
authentically cares about something, Dasein takes a stand on it and owns the moment by 
confronting the uniqueness and anxiety of the situation:265  
‘Resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its actual factical potentiality-of-being in 
such a way that it itself is this revealing and being revealed’.266  
Heidegger defines ‘the wholeness of being of Dasein as ‘care’’267 and it is in resoluteness 
that ‘constitutes the mode of authentic care’.268 By taking care of things in a way that 
responds to the disclosed situation of ‘the Moment’, Dasein both unconceals the situation 
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and its possibilities, as well as unconcealing itself and its potential to be authentic. The 
potential to be authentic, is the potential to be resolute in the face of unsettledness:  
‘Resolutely, Dasein takes over authentically in its existence the fact it is the null 
ground of its nullity, we conceived of death existentially as what we characterized 
as the possibility of the impossibility of existence, that is, as the absolute 
nothingness of Dasein. Death is not tacked onto Dasein as its “end”, but, as care, 
Dasein is the thrown (that is null) ground of its death’.269   
I will return to Heidegger’s concept of death within anxiety when discussing Extinction 
Rebellion’s symbolism and political activism, for now it is sufficient to say that death is 
‘the possibility of the impossibility of existence’. This means that unsettledness comes 
from the fact that it is possible Dasein can have no possibilities and be existentially dead. 
When Dasein is resolute, Dasein faces up to the possibility of its death, the inherent 
unsettledness of existence, which results in the ‘revealing and being revealed’ of unique 
possibilities from understanding this unsettledness.270 Caring about one’s existence 
authentically means acknowledging, understanding, and facing up to unsettledness, which 
for Heidegger is the ‘ownmost potentiality-of-being’.271  
Heidegger calls the revealing of the unsettledness, ‘anxiety’. He explains that the 
inauthentic mode of taking care of anxiety is to flee from it: 
‘In anxiety one has an “uncanny” feeling. Here, with anxiety, the peculiar 
indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself involved in anxiety initially finds 
expression in the nothing and nowhere, but uncanniness means at the same time 
not-being-at-home’.272  
The uncanniness ‘constantly pursues Dasein and threatens its everyday lostness’ thus 
putting at risk the ‘complete security and self-sufficiency of the everyday way of taking 
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care’.273 To protect the feeling of being-at-home Dasein typically ‘forgets’ about 
unsettledness, whereas authentic Dasein stands up to it: 
‘But anxiety can arise authentically only in a resolute Dasein. One who is resolute 
knows no fear, but understands the possibility of anxiety as the mood that does not 
hinder and confuse him. Anxiety frees one from “nullifying” possibilities and lets 
one become free for the authentic possibilities’.274   
Dasein typically flees from anxiety to feel at home. However, anxiety, when faced up to 
resolutely, importantly offers the possibility of taking up authentic possibilities within 
unsettledness, that recognise the situation and respond to it.  
In accepting unsettledness, Dasein does not need to forget about it. By understanding 
anxiety as a mood for disclosing possibilities, Dasein can face unsettledness as moments 
that do not necessarily close all possibility for Dasein, but open-up new ones. A breakdown 
is when familiar coping runs into trouble through a disturbance. A hammer is ‘ready-to-
hand’ to hammer with, and Dasein engages with the hammer in an everyday way of its 
availability to hammer with. As it is so familiar and we have a background understanding 
that a hammer hammers, its readiness-to-hand is concealed and remains inconspicuous. 
However, when the hammer is broken and its usefulness as a hammer is no longer 
available, it: 
‘draws the attention of the user to the system of relations of which it is a part as it is 
directed toward a specific task. At the instant of breakdown, Dasein catches sight of 
everything connected to the work; the totality of the "workshop," so to speak is lit 
up’.275 
A breakdown situation shines a light on the entity as it is and not in our everyday 
understanding of it: ‘and the phenomenon of the world announces its presence, disclosing 
the complex system of reference relations within which Dasein is immersed’.276 In a 
 
273 Ibid., p.183:189. 
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breakdown from the everyday taken-for-granted settledness of existence, the world shows 
up not as safe and secure but in the totality of the ‘workshop’ in which it operates with its 
inter-connected dependencies. The ontological structure of the phenomenon stands out 
when ‘the ease and transparency of normal transactions slips away’.277 Like Brecht’s 
alienation effect, where exposing the stage lighting brings appearance to the man-made 
artifice, or Rancière’s dissensus creating a fissure in the sensible order of consensus, a 
Heideggerian breakdown calls into question all things that are connected to what was once 
familiar and taken-for-granted. The situation of the broken hammer requires that we think 
about it; we can no longer see through it transparently as our everyday familiarity with it 
has slipped away. The hammer requires deliberate attention as the familiar form of coping, 
that relies on connected dependencies, is no longer possible once the hammer is broken 
and the connection to the workshop lost. The breakdown disrupts Dasein’s ability to forget 
the unsettledness of existence, that occurs in everyday coping, when Dasein is lost or fallen 
in das Man.  
Heidegger extends the concept of breakdown beyond examples of equipment, like the 
hammer, to possibilities in general:   
‘Occasionally, however, someone, by living in anxiety and thus facing his or her 
authentic condition, comes up with a new insight, new way of looking at the world. 
To discover such a new truth, one must begin with conventional opinion, which 
presents averageness as if it was the whole story. One must, starting from the 
conventional account, break out of it’.278  
It is from the ‘conventional account’ of das Man that it is possible to emerge, to have a 
‘new insight’ and way of looking at the world, by taking care of what matters to us and 
recognising the potential of being lost.  The disruption of a breakdown can work to bring 
about understanding or new thinking, breaking away from the familiar. ‘Living in anxiety’ 
means that Dasein can face up to his or her authentic condition of unsettledness, so that, 
when a breakdown situation comes along, Dasein already understands that the comfort of 
the everyday is not the whole story.   
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We are capable, in moments of breakdown, of looking at the inter-connectedness of things, 
understanding them, thinking about them, to: 
‘give us possibilities for different kinds of experience of and actions with entities, 
for different kinds of goals to be pursued, or forms of life to be lived. These 
possibilities are the possibilities opened up by the understanding of being and 
essences’.279   
Wrathall asks what is the “space” which allows those possibilities, and argues that 
Heidegger’s answer is ‘the clearing’:  
‘Unconcealment in general involves, then, making a variety [of] things available to 
us in our dealings in the world (true assertions, entities, human being, 
understandings of being, worlds, and the clearing itself)’.280 
The clearing (Lichtung), means literally a clearing in the forest, suggesting an open space 
in which Dasein can encounter objects, and deal with them in the situation, and where they 
show up in the light (licht) of our understanding; in this light they are unconcealed.281  
Dasein, as a result of being-in-the-world, discloses itself, its own being, and its potential to 
take up possibilities in ‘the clearing’, when ‘something like first sight becomes 
possible’.282 As Dasein discloses its being, things become “illuminated” and 
‘unconcealed’, and ‘only for a being thus cleared existentially do objectively present things 
become accessible in the light or concealed in darkness’.283 In authentic clearing, Dasein 
can: 
‘uncover the world in its own way…this uncovering of the ‘world’ [is]…always 
accomplished as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up 
of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way. (GA 2: H.129)’. 284 
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An authentic clearing is a moment that unconceals the unsettledness of the world and what 
is extra-ordinary, whilst always remaining within the context of the ordinary and 
familiar.285 Authentic clearing occurs because as world disclosers Dasein opens-up spaces 
for possibility, especially for things Dasein cares about, as its ‘full disclosedness is 
grounded in care’:286 
‘The being that bears the name Dasein is “cleared.” …This clearedness first makes 
possible any illumination or throwing light, any perceiving, “seeing,” or having of 
something…taking care…is already the advanced condition of being-in-the-
world’.287 
Things show up in the ‘light’, available for understanding and with possibilities beyond 
those publicly available, when they matter to Dasein: ‘what essentially clears this being, 
that is, makes it “open” as well as “bright” for itself, was defined as care’.288 Heidegger 
expounds in The Origin of the Work of Art that:  
‘In the midst of beings as a whole an open place comes to presence. There is a 
clearing. Thought from out of beings, it is more in being than is the being. This 
open centre is, therefore, not surrounded by beings. Rather, this illuminating center 
itself encircles all beings – like the nothing that we scarcely know. The being can 
only be, as a being, if it stands within, and stands out within, what is illuminated in 
this clearing. Only this clearing grants us human beings access to those beings that 
we ourselves are not and admittance to beings that we ourselves are’.289  
The clearing illuminates possibilities that are more than what we have available, opening a 
passage to ‘bring forth’ the ‘beings that we ourselves are not’ and more than we are 
now.290  
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Dreyfus explains that Heidegger uses another term, Augenblick,291 to describe a particular 
moment of possibilities. The “moment of vision” (literally “the blink of an eye”), 
designates the qualified authentic temporality, meaning that resoluteness ‘discloses the 
situation’ and holds up the possibilities within those unique circumstances: 292  
‘The present…never acquires another ecstatic horizon of its own accord, unless it is 
brought back from its lostness by a resolution, so that both the situation and thus 
the primordial ‘limit-situation’ of being-toward-death are disclosed as the Moment 
to be held onto’.293 
The ‘Moment’, Hans Ruin argues, ‘has its view to the possible situations of the 
potentiality-of-being-whole’, discloses the potential ‘of a radical decision’.294 This 
‘Moment’, where a radical decision is possible, comes about only when Dasein is resolute 
in the face of unsettledness. Therefore, a moment where the understanding of the situation 
results in a decision to deviate from public possibilities that flee from anxiety, and to take 
instead the possibilities that show up when Dasein acts on what it cares about, are 
considered ‘radical’ for Heidegger. Unfamiliar moments, such as anxiety or joy, provide 
the greatest illumination; when something is experienced as unfamiliar, and not as a pre-
given interpretation, there is a greater chance of illumination. In his later writings when he 
replaces the term Augenblick with Ereignis, Heidegger argues that such moments, should 
they ever happen, will be an ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’, that demand ‘decisions’.295 Richard 
Polt explains that Heidegger gives Ereignis several meanings over five decades of writing, 
but the most influential is that it is a moment where ‘the way in which the givenness of 
 
291 Augenblick was originally termed in Lukács, G. 1971, History and class consciousness: studies in 
Marxist dialectics, Merlin Press, London. However, Dreyfus explains that Heidegger derives his usage of 
Augenblick from Kiekeegaard’s ‘Oieblick’. Dreyfus, A Commentary, p.𝑥.  ‘The Moment’ (Augenblick) is 
authentic temporality, meaning it has-been in the past, is present, and is held up in the future. Whereas 
inauthentic or irresolute temporality makes the present, meaning Dasein is lost, forgetting itself, in the 
business of taking care of what is closest to Dasein in the present. Inauthentic Dasein ‘makes present 
its today, awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten what is old’, where time is a series of 
‘nows’ and the present is cut off from the past and the future. Heidegger argues authentic temporality 
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p.372:391. 
292 Dreyfus, A Commentary, pp.321-322. 
293 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.333:349. 
294 Ruin, H. 2002, ‘The moment of truth: Augenblick and Ereignis in Heidegger’, in Dreyfus, H. and 
Wrathall, M. (eds.), 2002, Heidegger Reexamined, London: Routledge. 
295 Polt, ‘Ereignis’, pp.375 – 391. 
Page 2-60 of 90 
 
 
given beings – including ourselves – comes into question for us’.296 In his essay, The 
Turning ¸ Heidegger questions how a transformation from the prevailing mode of 
disclosing is possible, arguing that Ereignis is where ‘disclosing coming-to-pass is 
bringing to sight that brings into its own’, meaning clearing or revealing beings as the 
beings they are.297 In the Ereignis experience, transformation from concealment becomes 
possible when concealment is resolutely accepted as an essential part of our being, and it is 
in this acceptance that unconcealment becomes possible. Therefore, in a moment of crisis, 
what is ‘given’ or assumed about being comes into question. Only in a case of extreme 
emergency, can being emerge where there is both the potential of disaster for the current 
way of being and the possibility of revelation. Polt acknowledges that finding an example 
of Ereignis in our own lives may be difficult, but it is possible that:  
‘A people might be shocked into something analogous to an artistic breakthrough, a 
fresh way of dwelling amidst things. This shock might be an overt emergency 
(something like September 11, 2001), but Heidegger would probably expect it to 
take a subtler form (such as a work of poetry). The effect would be a renewed 
“there” and a renewed concern with national heritage and destiny’.298 
Through a supreme effort to face the threat of disaster, we might begin to take part in the 
‘event of appropriation’. The event appropriates our understanding ‘that there is something 
rather than nothing, that there are things and we ourselves are in their midst’.299 The event 
of Ereignis, like authentic Dasein responding to the demands of the situation, demands we 
own the age of our time, ‘an entrance’ or ‘transporting of a people into its appointed 
task’.300 It is only then it would be possible to make a revolutionary change to the way we 
be, that could result in ‘a fresh way of dwelling’, or further, an epoch change. 
Heidegger argues that the current ‘clearing’ of modernity is a ‘technological’ one, where 
the world shows up exclusively in terms of ‘being-for-us’ as ‘resource’, concealing our 
ability to interpret the world of ‘being-in-itself’.301 The world in its most ordinary and 
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obvious sense is a resource for Dasein. In the technological age of modernity (das Gestell), 
which is deeply inauthentic, Dasein understands all entities as resource on ‘standing-
reserve’ for Dasein’s usefulness.302 Its essential essence is the process of concealment of 
everything apart from the unconcealment of the world as resource. The ‘extreme danger’ of 
modernity exists in driving ‘out every other possibility of revealing’ by concealing itself 
and its process of concealment.303 Despite Gestell being everydayness raised to epoch-
defining status for the modern age by marking ‘all revealing’ and blocking the ‘shining 
forth and holding-sway of truth’;304 a ‘gentle, non-violent’ relation to, and unconcealment 
of, the world is possible:305   
‘Gestell, however, drives out our ability even to see the whatness, objectness, the 
in-itselfness of beings. By doing so it deprives us of the ability to stand in a gentle, 
care-ful as opposed to violent, relation to things’.306  
Like dissensus emerging from and with consensus, care-ful non-violence, emerges from 
rather than replaces an interpretation of world as resource. It will become an unconcealed 
interpretation of the world rather than the concealed one that is kept in the dark.307 In Being 
and Time Heidegger explains that the way beings show up in everyday familiarity is ready-
to-hand as resource. It is only in exceptional moments of breakdown that disrupt the 
smooth functioning of things, illuminating them in a new way, that things can show up 
authentically as they are.308 Therefore, something extraordinary must happen, or in 
 
302 Heidegger uses the term Gestell (translated as ‘Enframing’) to denote the mode of unconcealment 
that ‘holds sway’ within modern epoch of technology: ‘The essence of Enframing is that setting-upon 
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Rancièrian terms something must ‘burst onto the scene’, for the world not to show up as 
pure resource. 
Despite the seeming omnipresence of the age of technology, Heidegger’s concept of 
Ereignis reminds us that ‘people might be shocked into something analogous to an artistic 
breakthrough, a fresh way of dwelling amidst things’.309 In The Origin of the Work of Art 
Heidegger calls the extraordinary moment ‘the artwork’; then in a reference to Hölderlin’s 
poetry he terms the moment ‘the festival’, which is an authentic ‘transportation’ from the 
everyday; a stepping out of the banal to something unusual or better.310 The artwork: 
‘from out of the poeticizing essence of truth it happens that an open place is thrown 
open, a place in which everything is other than it was. In virtue of the projection of 
the unconcealedness of beings which is set into the work and casts itself towards 
us, everything ordinary and hitherto existing becomes an un-being…The 
effecting…of the work…lies in a transformation of the unconcealment of beings 
which happens from out of the work, a transformation, that is to say, of being’.311   
Heidegger affords works of art the potential to be Ereignis events, capable of transforming 
our everyday interpretations and horizons of possibility: ‘that disrupt the technological 
clearing’.312 In The Origin, Heidegger replaces anxiety as the agent of authenticity with 
‘the artwork’, which attributes the capability of authenticity to collective Dasein, or ‘a 
people’.313 The members of the people, as revealed by the artwork, share their ‘appointed 
task’ in a common commitment or project.314 Like Rancière’s Emancipated Spectator, the 
audience interprets the artwork authentically when they do so with their own story, 
continually and creatively reinterpreting it, yet reaching a shared task.  
When the ‘clearing’ happens, our current way of projecting possibilities clears itself and 
lights up, becoming ‘transparent’ so we can see through it, through the darkness of its 
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previous concealment.315 When one escapes from the ‘illusions’ of the everyday, like 
Brecht’s Operatic Theatre or Rancière’s consensus,316 the world is capable of showing up 
in its essence, as something to be revered, ‘guarded’317, and cared for; it is illuminated in 
‘the radiance’ as what it is both beautiful and fragile.318 It is only possible to care for things 
authentically when they show up in their ownness. Whereas, when the world shows up as 
entangled in being-there-for-us as resource, we care for it in a way that is inauthentically 
connected with our everyday busyness. As we saw earlier, authentic care is in resolute 
anticipation of anxiety, meaning capable of taking up possibilities that face up to Dasein’s 
unsettledness and respond to the uniqueness of the situation. Therefore, Dasein’s audience 
(collective Dasein) must be capable of a ‘festive state of disclosure’ as well as the 
‘everyday state of disclosure’. The audience must be capable of an Ereignis-experience of 
‘transport and enchantment’ to a common commitment in authentically being-with-one-
another.319 Is it possible that the Rancièrian aesthetic disruptions, offered by Extinction 
Rebellion in theatrical stagings, could be such artworks capable of being an Ereignis 
event? Are they capable of formulating an epoch shift in our relationship with world? Can 
Extinction Rebellion bring about a way of Dasein’s disclosing of the world not as mere 
resource, but in a shared relationship of care to ‘preserve’ the world?320   
 
315 Young, Later Philosophy, p.81. 
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3 The politics of Extinction Rebellion 
‘We will not silently accept our extinction! We will stand up and dance!’ 
(Extinction Rebellion) 321    
3.1 Unconcealment by ‘dissensus’ 
In 1832, revolutionary Auguste Blanqui was tried, as a member of the Amis du Peuple 
(‘Friends of the People’) society, for maintaining his republican beliefs during the reign of 
Louis Phillipe, King of France. Rancière cites Balnqui’s defence speech at the ‘Trial of the 
Fifteen’ and places importance on an exchange between Blanqui and the magistrate. When 
Blanqui is asked his profession by the magistrate, he replies: “proletarian”. The magistrate 
advises that “proletarian” is not a profession, and Blanqui retorts: “It is the profession of 
thirty million Frenchmen who live off their labour and who are deprived of political 
rights”.322 The judge agrees to note “proletarian” down as Blanqui’s profession. The 
significance of this speech scene for Rancière is that Blanqui successfully brought together 
the world of politics and the world of work; worlds that are kept distinct and separate in 
consensus. The first world is represented by the magistrate and is consensual, the second 
world is represented by Blanqui and is dissensual. The dissensual world creates a 
disruption of the sensible, which ‘inscribes a subject name as being different from any 
identified part of the community’;323 making possible the scene’s reinterpretation. In this 
moment Blanqui, from the perspective of the proletariat, unconceals the relationship 
between politics and work; a connection concealed by the magistrate’s consensual 
interpretation. The consensual world sees profession as a job or trade giving the body 
meaning through its function as labour, whereas Blanqui gives profession the meaning of 
‘a faith, a declaration of membership of a collective.’324 The fact that the judge changes his 
mind and formally creates a new profession within the procedures of court is not what is 
important about this scene: the goal is not to convince the judge. The judge’s actions are an 
act of consensus, an attempt to assimilate Blanqui’s egalitarian world into the inegalitarian 
world of the judge, by assimilating the relationship between law and politics into law. 
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What is important to Rancière is that Blanqui achieves an inscription of the word 
“proletarian” that remains incongruous. The dissensual world, where work and politics 
have a relationship, is held up against the judge’s consensual world where there is no 
relationship, maintaining the incongruity is what brings the two worlds into one. The 
moment of political dissensus, therefore, is Blanqui’s response where he ‘inscribes the 
uncounted in a space where they are countable as uncounted’.325 Despite the Rights of Man 
and equality before the law, proletarian labours do not bring about rights that can be 
practically used. This is the declaration of, and exposure of, ‘wrong’ within consensus as it 
unconceals inequality: ‘the proletariat has no existence as a real part of society’.326 This is 
the beginning, not the end of the process of subjectification of wrong. Blanqui’s dissensual 
moment shakes off the obviousness of the common-sensical interpretation that there is no 
relationship between work and politics. 
Hallam describes his own experience where the judiciary attempted to assimilate his 
political action within the consensual frame of understanding of the law. He painted 
messages on the walls of King’s College London, with the goal of dissuading the college 
from investing in fossil fuels. As summarised by another activist, Hallam “broke the law 
because the law is broken”.327 When Hallam was banned from his place of employment, he 
escalated the protest by threatening to go on hunger strike until they changed their policy. 
The university was so embarrassed by the support he gained they were forced into 
divestment in fossil fuels. Although the university did not press charges, over a year after 
painting the walls, the crown prosecution decided to prosecute for ‘criminal damage 
without lawful excuse’.328 Hallam explains that whilst in court he repeatedly started talking 
about climate change and each time was interrupted by the judge. The judge told him to 
stop talking about climate change as the case had nothing to do with it. In the judge’s view 
it was a clear and simple case; he had put paint on the wall, it was against the law, and 
therefore Hallam was guilty. In a similar case, activists vandalised Shell’s headquarters to 
symbolise that vandalism to the planet should be considered illegal; the activists’ goal was 
to bring attention to Shell’s contribution to “ecocide” and thus evidence “who the real 
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criminals are”. During the trial, the judge explained his position to the jury that there was 
no defence available in law:  
“As I have said already, this is a court of law, it is not a court of morals…I have 
given you clear direction on what the law is and your duty to apply that law to the 
facts as you find them to be…reach true verdicts according to the evidence…Those 
are not mere empty words. A true verdict is one that is reached having all due 
regard to the law. That is how our jury system works and that is what you all 
pledged to do”.329 
In Hallam’s case, he continued to argue that his acts were not criminal as his actions were 
intended to prevent ongoing harm created by the university’s financial support of the fossil 
fuel industry. In his view he ‘had the right of necessity to cause disruption in order to 
prevent massive disruption’.330 Hallam ruptures the common-sense logic of the law that his 
actions were criminal; he brings the consensual world together with his world where the 
actions of Trinity College, not his, are criminal, as they are destroying the planet.  
Although the judge was not capable of recognising this alternative world, the jury was. The 
jury reached their conclusion based on morality, “a deeply felt act of conscience”, not law. 
They recognised Hallam’s actions were to “prevent harm” and “not cause it”: to care for 
the world, not add to its destruction.331 
Hallam evokes Rancièrian dissensus theory, of bringing two worlds together, when he 
remarks on the episode, that: 
‘This total opposition of world views between the elites and the people is going to 
explode. Our job is to bring about this ‘correction’ in an ordered, nonviolent way 
through mass civil disobedience – but one way or another it is coming, racing down 
the tracks’.332 
The two worlds of the polemical scene that Hallam brought together were his world where 
his actions were necessary to stop the more harmful and morally criminal impact of the 
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university’s support of fossil fuels, compared to the judge’s world of formal legality, where 
the facts spoke for themselves as objectively illegal. Hallam said throughout the trial it was 
about climate change, and these declarative speech acts created an inscription that allowed 
the second world to come in; disrupting the legal interpretation of the events, confronting 
the jury with something else, the morality of his actions and giving the jury the ‘equal 
capacity of speaking beings’, to interpret the event within the new world. His goal was not 
to embed his protest within the police logic of law, by subsuming his actions through an 
extension of freedom of speech and protest, instead he sought to go beyond these 
accommodations. In the Shell case, rebels declared: “it is a significant victory for the truth 
of these times, when despite the letter of the law, jurors can clearly see that a broken 
window is a just response to a breaking world”.333 Like Blanqui’s connection between 
politics and profession, the moment of dissensus for Hallam is his jolt and disruption of the 
common sense by presenting and making visible an alternative interpretation, outside the 
institutions of law: his actions were morally defensible and those of Trinity were not. 
3.2 Unconcealment by ‘jolt’  
Brecht’s explanation of the difference between the audience of Dramatic Theatre and the 
audience of Epic Theatre, summarises one of the major challenges faced by Extinction 
Rebellion; how do they get their audience to move from a recognition of the climate 
emergency, but a belief that nothing can be done (dramatic audience) or that governments 
will sort it to out, to a determination to be part of the solution (epic audience)? Roger 
Hallam describes documentary film First Reformed, which is about a priest who considers 
blowing himself up in the face of the existential crisis of the climate emergency, 
highlighting the interviewer’s casual comment that humans are certain to be extinct by the 
end of the century. Hallam decries the attitude of both as nihilistic indifference, and 
believes it is their duty to protect society and step up to their responsibilities. In inciting 
rebellion, he hopes to encourage the audience to stand up; ‘to see a situation as it is rather 
than how you would like it to be and to respond in a responsible manner’.334 Hallam 
understands that Extinction Rebellion’s audience has a difficult choice to make to emerge 
from ‘cynicism and apathy’ (dramatic audience), to recognise the extent of the challenge 
faced by humanity, and then their responsibility to do something about it (epic audience). 
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Ripple and Houtman, Extinction Rebellion climate scientists, maintain that their role is to 
continue to tell the truth, regardless of political and social pressures that want to maintain 
the status quo, by presenting the facts of climate change whilst providing evidence-based 
solutions to address it. They cite a passage from Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring to explain 
the challenge faced by climates scientists of being the bearers of bad tidings:  
‘The road we have long been travelling is deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway 
on which we progress with great speed, but at the end lies disaster. The other fork 
in the road – the one ‘less travelled by’ – offers our last, our only chance to reach a 
destination that assures preservation of our earth’.335  
Thus, Extinction Rebellion need to engage their audience to think about the obviousness of 
the climate emergency critically, gain a deeper understanding of it, come off the ‘easy’ 
path, and take up action and opportunities that will be difficult but necessary. It is in this 
challenge that that Extinction Rebellion share the task of the dramaturg that is advanced by 
Brecht: to set the stage so that the audience respond to suffering by demanding ‘it’s got to 
stop’, compelling them to act on that belief.  
Brecht explains that as the theatre began to become ‘instructive’ about subjects of 
theatrical representation such as ‘oil, inflation, war and social struggles’, ‘choruses 
enlightened the spectator about facts unknown to him’.336  But he recognises the challenge 
of such rational instruction, and engaging an audience on political issues at the theatre, 
where the audience is used to being entertained: 
‘Generally there is felt to be a very sharp distinction between learning and amusing 
oneself. The first may be useful, but only the second is pleasant. So we have to 
defend the epic theatre against the suspicion that it is highly disagreeable, 
humourless, indeed strenuous affair’.337 
By ‘defending’ epic theatre against the suspicion that it is ‘humourless’, he is advocating 
that epic theatre can be both instructive and entertaining: the best way to engage an 
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audience is to offer both. Extinction Rebellion agree. Their position is best summarised in 
their call to action from artists and musicians to join the rebellion: ‘we will not silently 
accept our extinction! We will stand up and dance!’338 Following Brecht, there is a dual 
necessity for Extinction Rebellion’s interventions to present to the Epic audience the 
seriousness of the threat of extinction, whilst also approaching the engagement of the 
audience in a mood of entertainment. 
An illustrative example from Extinction Rebellion of a theatrical intervention, analogous to 
a Brechtian Epic stage, that meets the dual demand to present both rational thought on a 
difficult subject and offer entertainment, is the Big Pink Boat. The boat was the primary 
symbol of the April Rebellion in London, emblazoned with the message ‘Tell the Truth’.339 
The fact that it is painted bright pink and acts as a DJ stage, around which the audience can 
dance as is if they were at a festival, represents the entertaining part of the symbol. Activist 
J, who bought The Big Pink Boat, visualised the boat standing above a sea of heads from 
the audience, symbolising the threat to the audience of impending flood from climate 
meltdown, as well as the role of mankind in its creation.340 Like Brecht’s projections 
showing ‘contradictory messages’ to what is occurring on stage, the boat stood for two 
things at once: a lifeboat that could save humanity from the flood, but also how the 
surroundings and audience at Oxford Circus are contributors to the threat.341 The boat, akin 
to Brecht’s stage effects, acts as an ‘organ of communication’, inviting dialogue on the 
extent of the challenge, whilst simultaneously asking the audience to consider how the 
challenge can be faced with a mood of fun, hope, and optimism.  
The comparisons to Brecht’s theory can be extended further, when Brecht uses stage 
techniques to expose the artifice of the stage, he does so to show the audience the effort 
that goes into a stage production. This creates an illusion for the audience that what is 
unfolding is a real story, covering up that it is a representation of a story. Unconcealing the 
concealment of the illusion helps the audience take a more a critical interpretation of the 
events of the stage production, engaging beyond the character’s narrative journey. That is 
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what made the placing of the boat in Oxford Circus so important, it is a symbolic location 
of capitalism. Accordingly, XR created a space for the audience to reinterpret the location 
of the stage, not as a place of business-as-usual shopping, but as a place that contributes to 
the climate emergency: situating the ‘future we fear’ in the present. The arrival of the boat 
brings London’s central shopping district to a stand-still, disrupting its appearance as the 
‘move along’ space of consumerism. The disruption of the audience’s standard 
interpretation of the space, repurposes it, allowing for consideration the challenges of 
climate change and the fun of imagining alternatives. Brecht exposes the illusion of how 
dramatic theatre hides the very fact that the stage has been set up to influence or limit the 
audience’s interpretation of events on the stage. Comparably, Extinction Rebellion’s 
placing of their stage invites the audience to take the position of critical observer and 
engage in the conversation themselves. 
Another facet of Brecht’s alienation effect is to exhibit the work that goes into creating the 
stage and dramatic theatre’s illusion of the character’s narrative. The Big Pink Boat is a 
symbol of a commitment to change, represented to the audience by the work and effort that 
has gone into getting the boat to such a difficult location. Activists glue themselves to the 
boat, becoming ‘barnacles’, to protect the new space of interpretation that has been 
inserted to disrupt the status quo. When the audience sees the police trying to remove the 
boat and the barnacles attached to it, their desire to protect this symbolic lifeboat is 
heightened: 
‘With time, people feel emotionally attached to these road-block presences. They 
are defining cultural features of newly emerging micro-communities who will go to 
extreme lengths to protect them’.342 
The audience is forced to consider the work and commitment made to erect the boat. In 
Brecht’s stage notes to Beggar’s Opera, explain that by bringing the audience attention to 
the construction of the stage, engages them to realise that this effort has been made 
‘ingeniously’ for them, thus encouraging them to think: 
 ‘You shall project the titles of the events 
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To come, for the sake of tensions and that 
The right thing may be expected. And please make  
My curtain half-height, don’t cut the stage off. 
Leaning back, let the spectator 
Notice the busy preparations being so  
Ingeniously made for him’.343 
The audience at Oxford Circus might get swept up in the festival, but the symbol of the Big 
Pink Boat remains a stark reminder that work is still to be done to help stem the tide of 
climate change: 
‘The projections are in no way pure mechanical aids in the sense of being extras, 
they are no pons asinorum344; they do not set out to help the spectator but to block 
him; they prevent his complete empathy, interrupt his being automatically carried 
away’.345 
The dual role of the theatrical disturbance of the Big Pink Boat, as both a stage of 
entertainment and a space for discourse, does not allow the crowd to get ‘carried away’ 
with the entertainment, or ‘to submit to an experience uncritically’.346 There are no ‘pons 
asinorum’ as what is presented is a different way of making sense; there is no preclusion of 
the audience due to the difficulty of the political theory, instead it is a disruption to the 
existing common sense through a moment of entertainment. It is an invitation to the 
audience to reinterpret the common sense and define their own action in response. It is an 
invitation to ‘stand up and dance’. 
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3.3 Unconcealment by ‘clearing’ 
‘The mortals dwell in so far as they save the earth…To save really means to leave 
something free in its own nature’. 
(Martin Heidegger)347 
Heidegger’s concept of das Man is instructive for Extinction Rebellion in understanding its 
audience; they are ‘entangled’ in the ‘levelled-down’ and ‘banal’ of the everyday, where 
‘distantiality’ is ‘quashed’ to protect the ‘tranquillity’ of being settled. This is also true of 
Extinction Rebellion; their protest seeks to disrupt business-as-usual like an act of 
Heideggerian distantiality. Therefore, das Man’s care for averageness, is useful in realising 
why XR’s radical voice is ‘quietly supressed’; their demands to ‘tell the truth’, and ‘act 
now’ are limited by Dasein’s prevailing mode of disclosure. Heidegger sets an entrenched 
stage of concealment, ‘that threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him 
to enter into a more original revealing’,348 from which Extinction Rebellion’s demands and 
its audience must emerge in moments of unconcealment. The demand to ‘tell the truth’, 
can only come to pass when there is an ‘uncovering’ of the essence of Dasein and the 
modern age. Truth can only occur when we have a ‘free’ relationship with the fact that we 
typically conceal things, and that disclosure in the modern age conceals everything but the 
world as ‘standing-reserve’.349 In this ‘truth, which is unconcealment’, a ‘safekeeping 
carries itself out’.350 The task that Extinction Rebellion face is disrupting an inauthentic 
mode of disclosing the world and unconcealing an authentic one. Extinction Rebellion 
challenge its audience to consider the reality that they cannot rely on the planet to always 
be there for them; their existence on earth is unsettled and cannot be taken for granted. 
That means highlighting, or unconcealing, the true nature of earth as fragile and finite, it 
will not always be available to us as a resource.  
Central to Extinction Rebellion’s iconography is the image of the hourglass, symbolising 
the sands of time slipping away as we sleepwalk towards our extinction. With a slogan 
“Business as Usual = Death”, XR activists stopped the DLR in Canary Wharf demanding 
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that the financial industry and the government tells the truth about their roles in funding the 
climate and ecological crisis by citing ‘the financial sector’s role in our collective 
suicide’.351 The ultimate breakdown and exposure of unsettledness is death. Death for 
Heidegger is not the end of life or demise (which is the publicly available understanding of 
death in das Man) but Dasein’s ‘ownmost possibility’, with existential death ‘the most 
extreme possibility’:352 
‘But being toward this possibility, as being-toward-death, should relate itself to 
death so that it reveals itself, in this being [Sein] and for it as possibility…The more 
clearly this possibility is understood, the more purely does understanding penetrate 
to it as the possibility of the impossibility of existence’.353 
Death is the structural annihilation of all possibilities. Blattner describes Heideggerian 
death as a ‘vulnerability’ because who you are and for-sake-of-which become impossible 
when Dasein is unable to press into those possibilities.354 To face up to this requires 
courage or ‘resoluteness’. However, like all things, Dasein’s natural disposition is to 
interpret death inauthentically; unable to acknowledge it, and ‘fleeing’ from the 
impossibility of possibilities. XR accept that their task is to jolt the public out of an 
everyday and levelled down understanding of death. Rather than “we all will die one day”, 
XR declare they are ‘not prepared to die’.355 Without a jolt that exposes the 
interconnectedness of human systems, inauthentic Dasein stays within the ‘business as 
usual = death’ formula. XR create a mood of anxiety disturbing their audience’s ability to 
forget the unsettledness of existence, a breakdown which has the potential to emancipate 
the audience from “nullifying” possibilities, thus allowing them to become free for 
authentic possibilities.356 
Authentic Dasein, faces up to and marches towards death. An authentic mode of disclosing 
the world is to understand Dasein’s fragility no matter how uncomfortable that truth is to 
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face. Dasein resolutely being-toward-death, in anticipation, is a form of authentic care,357 
‘opening up from out of its captivity by being into the openness of being’.358 Extinction 
Rebellion’s disruptive breakdowns are important because they open the space for their 
audience to ‘emerge from captivity’, by shining a light on the situation that we find 
ourselves in; the threat of climate collapse demands an authentic response, to open the 
‘range and freedom’ of possibilities:359 
‘When we confront our extreme condition of anxiety 
(depression)/death/conscience, however, we are jolted out of this complacency and 
forced to face the full range of our freedom…we can seize upon our freedom, see 
for the first time that we are called upon to answer to the situation, and not just the 
Anyone. Such a steady and steadfast self, true not to who we "really" are, but to 
how we are, is a self we construct through resolutely facing the challenges to our 
levelled-off complacency’.360 
Extinction Rebellion’s symbolism and declaration that ‘what you fear is already here’, 
places its audience face to face with death and asks the audience to confront it. It is from 
‘danger’ or ‘oblivion’ that an alternative can be unconcealed: 
‘The danger is the saving power, inasmuch as it brings the saving power out of its – 
the danger’s – concealed essence that is ever susceptible to turning’.361 
Heidegger cites the words of Hölderlin, to offer hope within despair – ‘But where danger 
is, grows the saving power also’. 362 He evokes the possibility that ‘when we look into the 
danger’ and the ‘closer we come’, we ‘see the growth of the saving power’, ‘the more 
closely…the ways into’ it ‘begin to shine’, which ‘may awaken and found anew our look 
into that which grants’ our capability for ‘safeguarding’ the earth.363 
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Heidegger acknowledges that ‘it is not clear’ whether art may be ‘granted’ the ‘highest 
possibility’ of ‘poetically revealing’ the growth of ‘the saving power’, or the ‘coming-to-
pass of truth’, but hopes that we will be ‘astounded’.364 The Red Rebel Brigade is a 
repeated, staged, and artistic image of living statues draped in red with white face paint, 
symbolising “the common blood we share with all species, that unifies us and makes us 
one”.365 It is a symbol that brings together Heidegger’s agents of authenticity, anxiety and 
the artwork. Doug Francisco, founder of The Invisible Theatre group, describes what has 
become a global and universal form of political protest and audience engagement:  
“It’s the most powerful thing I have ever said …. without speaking! Art can send a 
powerful message and when it resonates it connects with us in a much more 
powerful and profound way than words, in my opinion. Words have [sic. their] own 
magic but eyes are the gateway to the soul they say, so when we see something and 
it touches us we really feel it, music has a similar but different quality also”.366 
Francisco asserts that visual art often engages an audience more deeply than the spoken 
word; in his view the audience’s emotions are attuned to the visual symbolism. The 
unconcealment of the interconnectedness we share with nature occurs, like the 
Heideggerian artwork, because the scene’s ‘beauty’ is the ‘shining that is set into the work’ 
and ‘is one way in which truth as unconcealment comes to presence’.367  Through the 
artwork, the demand to ‘tell the truth’ becomes more than a claim to fact, put forward for 
validation, but an ‘essential and necessary way in which truth happens’. 368 As ‘truth is the 
self-illuminating being of beings’, it says something about the essence of being: what we 
truly are.369 Truth, achieved by the artwork, is how the ‘clearing determines itself out of the 
difference’ and unconceals how our being can go beyond the everyday and ‘transform’ into 
something extraordinary by ‘thrusting’ it up and ‘thrusting down the ordinary’.370 The 
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activists, set an artistic stage (Ereignis event), that must constantly re-invent itself, where 
the brigade silently and uniformly move amongst the crowd, inviting them to interpret the 
image in their own way; it is a confident and assertive stand for something different: a 
counter-flow against the tide. 
One act of protest illustrates why Extinction Rebellion’s recurring action is so important as 
concealment can subsequently subsume moments of unconcaelment: authenticity is never a 
‘once-and-for-all achievement. ‘Falling’ remains a constant threat’.371 When activists 
controversially dug up the lawn of Trinity College Cambridge, the intention was to 
highlight that one of the richest institutions in the United Kingdom, and the third biggest 
landowner, invests heavily in oil and gas companies. This direct action was hugely 
controversial and brought significant media and public backlash. Heidegger would posit 
that the reaction is typical of das Man responding to an act of distantiality; the actions both 
deviated from societal norms of respecting educational institutions and were contradictory 
to XR’s aims, as they had damaged green space. Consequently, the mood created by these 
actions is one of unsettledness and anxiety. The Daily Telegraph372 condemned the actions 
as disrespectful, whilst criticising the police for being too lenient on Extinction Rebellion 
for their criminal damage. To reassert consensual norms, the journalist elides the core 
message behind the actions, and omits that they aimed to encourage Trinity to disinvest in 
fossil fuels. This concealment is an act of das Man, both fleeing from the anxiety of the 
unsettledness created by the activists, and dampening down, within the horizon of 
averageness, what is exceptional and thrust to the fore.  
The activists explained that “one of Extinction Rebellions’ oppositions is to green space 
being kept behind walls and only accessible to those in power and privilege”.373  In 
Heideggerian terms, the manicured lawn is a representation of Gestell where everything 
shows up as resource for Dasein; in this case a space to be admired representing the 
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university’s institutional values. Contrary to Trinity’s intended visibility of busily preening 
the lawn, Extinction Rebellion expose this as inauthentic care. They achieve this by 
disturbing the visibility of the image and reconfiguring its appearance as a ‘diversity dead 
zone’, that is contributing to the destruction of the natural world. XR’s alternative and 
authentic mode of caring for the land was to create a flower bed to encourage 
environmental biodiversity. The image illustrates our dependence on nature and disrupts 
the logic of Gestell that ‘pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces’ 
within the frame of resource.374 The disruptive act clears the way for an alternative 
interpretation; opening a space where possibilities to treat the space as a flower bed show 
up in the light of the audience’s understanding like a moment of ‘first sight’. This is the 
critical point that Heideggerian philosophy offers Extinction Rebellion in their demand to 
go ‘beyond politics’. Extinction Rebellion, and their audience, can go beyond politics 
when they create a breakdown within everyday understanding that shines a light on the 
earth’s unsettledness. By resolutely standing up to this anxiety they create a clearing, 
which is ‘what we have defined as 'care'’.375  
The audience, in an authentic moment of clearing, uncovers the possibilities of the space in 
their own way, ‘away’ from the ‘disguises’ of the banal interpretation ‘with which Dasein 
bars its own way’:376  
‘Rum (space) means a place cleared for settlement and lodging…Spaces open 
themselves up, because they are let in to the dwelling of humans…The relationship 
between human and space is none other than dwelling’.377  
The lawn acts as stage to bring two worlds together: the world of the unquestioning 
common sense that institutional propriety should not be disrupted, and that economic 
necessity means that revenues should be generated by any means possible; and the world 
that unsettles that proposed common sense as no longer making sense. Bringing together 
the two world reconfigures the consensual view of the space as a flower bed, disrupting 
that image with the question as to whether that use would meet the demands of the threat to 
the natural world; challenging that it no longer makes sense to make money by 
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contributing to the planet’s destruction because this is the space in which we ‘dwell’, 
where our being exists. Extinction Rebellion ‘bring-forth’ the essence of the space as one 
of wonder that we reside in and are ‘grateful’ for, to be ‘preserved’ and ‘cared for’ but not 
preened, ‘like the busting of a blossom into bloom’.378 It is with this appearance that the 
‘transportation’ to a Heideggerian ‘festive state’ becomes possible, where the world is 
unconcealed as a place of reverence, that should be cared for and “preserved” as it is a 
space where we ‘dwell’ amongst others. Once unconcealed, Extinction Rebellion invite the 
members of their audience to join them on such a stage, each interpreting the scene with 
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Conclusion: Setting the stage 
‘It is more important nowadays for the set to tell the spectator he’s in a theatre than to tell 
him he’s in, say, Aulis. The theatre must acquire qua theatre the same fascinating reality 
as a sporting arena during a boxing match. The best thing is to show the machinery, the 
ropes and the flies. If the set represents a town it must look like a town that has been built 
to last precisely two hours…On the time-scale the set must plainly become intensified; it 
must have its own climax and special round of applause’. 
(Bertolt Brecht)379 
Habermas purports to set up the public sphere as an ‘egalitarian’ stage, capable of 
generating ‘subcultural counterpublics and counterinstitutions, to consolidate new 
collective identities, and win new terrain in the form of expanded rights and reformed 
institutions’.380 According to Habermas, the public sphere is capable of fostering ‘radical 
democracy’ as it is a stage on which to ‘mobilise counterknowledge’ through rational 
discourse that unconceals ‘its own translations’ of prevailing norms.381 This mobilisation 
can occur because of its inclusivity, by inviting any actor or debate to the stage. The public 
sphere is constituted in ‘every encounter’ where speech-actors attribute to each other 
‘communicative freedom’ and thus a ‘space stands open’ for any person or debate.382  
However, when we consider the constitution of Habermas’ stage with Heidegger’s 
phenomenological analysis of Dasein, we see that actors engaging in the public sphere will 
most commonly be doing so as das Man. Heidegger’s analysis helps us comprehend an 
inadvertent concealment that Habermas’ theory fails to adequately deal with; by setting the 
stage as ‘public’ and inviting ‘citizens’ to present arguments to be processed through the 
institutions of law and political decision making, Habermas consigns the discussion to the 
‘banalised’ and ‘levelled-down’ possibilities of public everydayness. Rational discourse in 
the public sphere about the threat of extinction of planet earth is, from a Heideggerian 
perspective, is likely to be carried out in an ‘irresolute’ way, that ‘flees’ from 
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unsettledness, the potential of existential death, and ‘the possibility of the impossibility of 
existence’.383 
Whereas the risk inherent in Habermas’ staging of the public sphere is that the audience 
takes up public possibilities that are inadequate to meet the urgent demands of climate 
emergency; Brecht’s stage setting is designed specifically to illuminate for the audience 
that the stage itself is finite, set only to last for ‘two hours’. Extinction Rebellion seek to 
highlight the urgency of the threat and the need for radical action as a response; like the 
dramaturg, to create moments that present the world in an unfamiliar light. Although they 
disrupt the everyday flow of traffic and commerce to set up stages of festival, they do so in 
a way that does not take the edge off the unfamiliarity and unsettledness of the threat of 
extinction. Habermas acknowledges that the public sphere occurs in moments of political 
discourse; where once the argument is made rationally the stage is set, actors are invited to 
join, ‘revitalizing and enlarging...the public sphere as well as with confirming their own 
identities and capacities to act’384. Extinction Rebellion, by contrast, set up their street 
stages so that they are, like Brecht’s boxing arena, visible only temporarily until the 
performance reaches a ‘climax’. This is an important metaphor for what is being 
unconcealed. The institutions of political decision making have failed to acknowledge the 
urgency of the emergency and take the appropriate action; they cannot be relied upon to do 
the job for us: that common sense is to be disrupted.  
The ‘transportation’ of the audience from common sense to ‘enchantment’ of ‘festival’385 
can occur in the same way that Brecht argues it is the dramaturg’s responsibility to shift 
their audience from operatic to epic: capable of being ‘alterable and able to alter’ and 
aroused for transformative action.386 Or the transportation could occur in the way Rancière 
sets up the ‘Emancipated Spectator’ as being able to ‘sketch a new topography of the 
possible’.387 Similarly, when Extinction Rebellion take on the responsibility to go ‘beyond 
politics’, they set a stage where the audience can learn how to enter Heidegger’s ‘festive 
state’,388 despite an environment where Gestell and das Man dominate.  Extinction 
Rebellion are exemplars of Heideggerian authentic care because they acknowledge the 
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finitude and unsettledness of the world, responding with an ‘obedience to the preservation 
of a belonging to what is essential in all beings’.389 They revere the world in its ‘radiance’, 
interpret it as a ‘place of dwelling’,390 as opposed to ‘resource’, and most importantly 
recognise as dwellers on earth their ‘primary concern and activity is directed to fostering 
the dwelling of others’.391 Their hard work or artistic imagery may not, yet, have resulted 
in an Heideggerian epoch shift or a world turning Ereignis event. Their audience is yet to, 
as an everyday way of disclosing, revere the world, where treating it as resource no longer 
makes sense as a prevailing consensus. They have not yet created an authentic community 
resolutely standing up to the unique circumstances of the threat of climate change or 
adopting, in their own way, a shared task of care. However, they do achieve moments of 
unconcealment: moments of dissensual disturbance of the distribution of role and place; 
moments of theatre ‘whose mode of presentation is not homogenous with the ordinary 
mode of existence of the objects thereby identified’;392 moments of ‘artwork’ that 
beautifully ‘reveal…poetic dwelling’ on earth.393 
Simon Critchley in Infinitely Demanding closes with a call to action in response to the 
infinite ethical demand to do more to begin the dirty work of political change. For 
Critchley ‘no revolution will be generated out of systemic or structural laws’;394 we have to 
do it ourselves in action.  We need to construct ourselves as political actors in a ‘concrete 
situation’ where the work is ‘dirty, detailed…and largely unthrilling. It is time we made a 
start’.395 Extinction Rebellion have started this work, arduously illuminating moments of 
concealment within business-as-usual politics, unconcealing possibilities beyond its 
limiting horizons, creatively re-inventing their disturbances in recognition that with every 
unconcealment exists the constant risk of falling into concealment. They are, each day, 
creating stages for their audience to take up authentic possibilities, possibilities that are, as 
Heidegger’s analysis shows, difficult for the audience to adopt as it means facing up to the 
threat of extinction. They stand as a ‘cell of resistance’396 against the tide of Gestell, das 
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Man, consensus, and set up stages for an epic rather than an operatic theatre audience. 
Stages that unconceal, that despite a dominant mode of world-disclosure, frames of 
understanding the world and its possibilities are not homogenous: alternatives disclosures 
of care are possible. Extinction Rebellion, as dwellers on the unconcealed stage, invite 
others to dwell with them.  
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